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TOWARDS MANAGING AND UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF 
UNDERWATER TERRORISM 
Richard J. Gay 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Patrick Hester 
This dissertation proposes a methodology to manage and understand the risk of 
underwater terrorism to critical infrastructures utilizing the parameters of the risk 
equation. Current methods frequently rely on statistical methods, which suffer from a 
lack of appropriate historical data to produce distributions and do not integrate epistemic 
uncertainty. Other methods rely on locating subject matter experts who can provide 
judgment and then undertaking an associated validation of these judgments. 
Using experimentation, data from unclassified successful, or near successful, underwater 
attacks are analyzed and instantiated as a network graph with the key characteristics of 
the risk of terrorism represented as nodes and the relationship between the key 
characteristics forming the edges. The values of the key characteristics, instantiated as 
the length of the edges, are defaulted to absolute uncertainty, the state where there is no 
information for, or against, a particular causal factor. To facilitate obtaining the value of 
the nodes, the Malice spectrum is formally defined which provides a dimensionless, 
methodology independent model to determine the value of any given parameter. The 
methodology produces a meta-model constructed from the relationships between the 
parameters of the risk equation, which determines a relative risk value. 
This dissertation is dedicated to my God, 
"who trains my hands for war, and my fingers for battle" 
Psalm 144:1 (Revised Standard Version) 
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NOMENCLATURE 
A Activity (of an attacker) 
AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers 
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group 
C Consequence (of an attack) 
Ca Capability (of an attacker) 
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety 
CI Critical infrastructure 
COBP Code of Best Practices 
COBPE Code of Best Practices for Experimentation 
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 
I Intent (of an attacker) 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
JI Jemaah Islamiyah 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
MSRAM Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model 
n Sample size (for statistical analysis) 
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute 
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
PLF Palestine Liberation Front 
R Risk (of an attack) 
T Threat (of an attack) 
V Vulnerability (of an attack) 
VAM-CF Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Chemical Facilities 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ix 
LIST OF FIGURES x 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 1 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 2 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 
1.4 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 4 
1.5 KEY ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 4 
1.6 LIMITATIONS 5 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 8 
2.1 UNCERTAINTY 11 
2.2 RISK 18 
2.3 RISK MANAGEMENT IN TERRORISM SCENARIOS 29 
2.4 UNDERWATER TERRORISM 33 
2.5 PARAMETERS 38 
2.6 ONGOING RESEARCH 41 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 43 
3.1 MEANING 43 
3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 43 
3.3 RATIONALE FOR METHOD 49 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 51 
3.5 PROCESS 56 
3.6 PHASE 2: EXPERIMENT 66 
3.7 PHASE 3: POST-EXPERIMENT 66 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 67 
4.1 EXPERT OPINION OF PARAMETERS 67 
4.2 How TO QUANTIFY QUALITATIVE VARIABLES 68 
4.3 SAMPLE A 70 
4.4 RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT FOR SAMPLE A 79 
4.5 SAMPLE B 84 
5. CONCLUSION 95 
5.1 DISCUSSION 95 
5.2 OBJECTIVE UTILITY 102 
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 105 




APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 122 
APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION PLAN 124 
APPENDIX C: DATA COLLECTION LOG EXAMPLE 126 
APPENDIX D: TEST RESULTS FROM SAMPLE A 127 
VITA 136 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1: Operational definitions 48 
2: Databases used in this research 53 
3: Keywords used in database search 58 
4. Requirements traceability matrix 64 
5: Covariance results for Sample A 72 
6: Positive values from covariance for Sample A 73 
7: Negative values from covariance for Sample A 73 
8: Results of correlation of covariance for Sample A 74 
9: Test requirement 1.0, create geometric characteristic from a matrix results 77 
10: Test requirement 2.0 and 3.0, given a matrix determine surface area and sum 
of the edge lengths results 77 
11: Covariance results for Sample B 86 
12: Positive values from covariance for Sample B 86 
13: Correlation of coefficients for Sample B 87 
14: Test requirement 1.0, create geometric characteristic from a matrix results 89 
15: Test requirement 3.0, given a matrix determine the sum of the edge lengths 90 
16. Test requirements 4.0, using special cases for the test protocol given in 3.0, 
determine the sum of the edges results 90 
X 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1: Path of the literature review 8 
2: Sources of uncertainty (adapted from Haimes, 2004, p. 239) 13 
3: Planes of uncertainty 17 
4: Relationship between uncertainty and risk 26 
5: Ladder of abstraction 44 
6: Research design 51 
7: Research phases 54 
8: Research process 56 
9: Expert opinion of parameter importance and ease 68 
10: Estimative language continuum 69 
11: Malice spectrum 70 
12: Each parameter's occurrence in Sample A by percent 71 
13: Complete network graph for Sample A 75 
14: Network graph of the unique relationships from Sample A 76 
15: Test results from Sample A - sum of the edges computed using triangles formed... 78 
16: Test results from Sample A - sum of the edges computed from network diagram... 79 
17: Sample A's surface area and sum of the edges results using the edges of the 
triangles formed for computations 80 
18; Sample A's sum of the edges and surface area using the triangles formed method ..81 
19: Sample A's surface area and sum of edges using the network method 82 
20: Sample A's sum of edges from the experiment 83 
21: Sample A's sum of the edges using the network diagram 84 
22: Each parameter's occurrence in Sample B by percent 85 
xi 
Figure Page 
23: Sample B network graph - all parameters 88 
24: Sample B network graph without the parameter unique environment (u) 89 
25: Test results from Sample B - triangle method 92 
26: Sample B experimentation results - sum of edges using triangle edge method 93 
27: Sample B's experimental results - sum of edges using network method 94 
28: Comparison of Sample B's raw data to calculated relative risk 103 




1.1 Problem statement 
The threat of terrorism remains a global concern (Cobain & Karim, 2011; DefenceWire, 
2008; Fuard & Kamalendran, 2006; Gendar, Alpert & Parascandola, 2010) that 
challenges risk managers, in both the government and private sectors, to manage and 
understand the nature of the risk to minimize the expense of mitigation while holistically 
addressing the underlying issues. The existing methods of risk analysis for terrorism 
have inherent weaknesses primarily derived from the emphasis on statistical processes or 
expert opinion. A terrorist organization conducts extensive planning and is reactive to a 
defender's actions; therefore the nature of the threat is not random but deterministic 
(Darby, 2006) and using a stochastic process to model the system is contraindicated. 
This is exasperated in the underwater domain by the minimal number of attacks, on 
targets with great diversity, which hamper the ability to create accurate probability 
distributions (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006). In many instances, the application of 
statistics is prone to the assumption that the probability of attack is, by default, absolutely 
certain (i.e.: p(attack) = 1.0) (Apostolakis, & Lemon, 2005; Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron, & 
Wood, 2005; Johnson, Khater, & Kuzak, 2005; Levitin, & Ben-Haim, 2008) a false 
assumption given the large quantity of critical infrastructure and the extremely low 
number of attackers. Applicable to any method employed to determine risk is the 
introduction of bias and errors when quantifying qualitative values (Meehl, 1978; Rao, 
Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2007). Another concern is that the assumption is 
occasionally made that the attack scenario is ergodic. Given the various rationalities of 
the adversarial organizations involved, their intentions and their capabilities, this 
assumption is incorrect (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006; Macgill & Siu, 2005). 
Finally, in some risk evaluation methodologies a homogenous viewpoint is employed 
which constrains the risk equation as a convolution of two or three elements, principally 
threat, consequence and vulnerability at the end of the solution of the risk equation, 
ignoring the dependent nature of the three elements (Jenelius, Petersen, & Mattson, 2006; 
Daneshkhah, 2004; Kaplan, 2002). 
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1.2 Research objective 
The objective of this research is to improve the ability to manage and understand the risk 
of underwater terrorism by creating a model based on the relationships of the elements in 
the risk equation. This research inductively examined available data to develop and 
analyze a list of parameters and relationships, which was used to deductively create a 
multi-perspective model of the risk equation. This research provides an improved 
understanding of the intent, capability and actions of adversaries, which may assist in 
identifying options to defeat them. Haimes (2004) summarized the benefit of this 
undertaking when he noted that policy involving risks is readily accepted when based on 
firm scientific foundations and steeped in credible scientific or technological information. 
Answering four research questions about the nature of the relationships between the 
adversary and the defender supported achieving the research objective. 
1.3 Research questions 
The nature of the risk of an underwater terrorist attack can be examined as related 
parameters with specific values (Gay & Hester, 2010). The following four research 
questions, derived from the precepts of developing a model from the Code of Best 
Practices for Experimentation (Alberts & Hayes, 2005), hereafter called the COBPE, 
mapped a path to holistically create a model of the underwater terrorism related 
parameters. 
1.3.1 Research Question One: What are the parameters of an underwater terrorism 
incident? 
As a starting point for the analysis of the parameters pertinent to this research, a list of the 
applicable parameters must be developed. The initial research, based on analysis of 
archived information available in government and other trusted databases; interviews 
with current practitioners of underwater defense and their Red Teams (opposing forces in 
simulated underwater attack exercises); and review of factors currently utilized in other 
terrorism incidents (e.g., surface, aircraft/airport, etc.), will develop a list of the pertinent 
parameters to be studied. This list, comprised of dependent and independent variables, 
will be ranked by relevance, based on the number of times the parameters were either 
available or considered, and their connection to other factors currently employed in risk 
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analysis. The dimensions of the parameters (e.g., unit of measure, range of values, time 
when known) will also be examined. 
1.3.2 Research Question Two: What are the relationships between the identified 
parameters? 
An understanding of the relationship between the parameters is necessary to truly 
understand the nature of the problem - and its solution space. In any complex adaptive 
system, such as a terrorism incident, relationships may indicate causality, including 
direction of causality (e.g., A—*B and B—>A). Additional questions, similar to those in 
research question one include appropriate units of measure and range of values. By 
mapping the relationships between the various parameters, an understanding of their 
impact and dependencies will be advanced. 
1.3.3 Research Question Three: What is the appropriate method to quantify the 
qualitative variables pertinent to an underwater terrorism threat incident? 
The values of many of the parameters are qualitative in nature (e.g., the intention of an 
adversary). To facilitate modeling, every parameter must be enumerable; basically the 
set of the possible elements for the parameter must be countable. Pending analysis of the 
parameters and relations, quantification may be achieved through several methods (e.g., 
fuzzy logic, matrix ranking, focus groups) that will ensure transparency and validity of 
the model. 
1.3.4 Research Question Four: What is the measure of risk? 
The objective of the research is to manage and understand the risk of an underwater 
terrorism incident. To better understand the magnitude of any scenario each scenario 
analyzed must have a final value, of one format or another (numerical, alphanumerical, 
etc.), potentially with a unit of measure, in order to compare the relative risk between 
them. The final value must have meaning to both the analyst and the policy maker, 
although meaning may be relative within the solution space and only applicable to the 
scenarios evaluated vice the total population space. 
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1.4 Research significance 
The importance of ports and waterways cannot be overstated since 1/3 of world's 
economy and 1/4 of the United States' economy relies on international commerce & 
trade, most of which is transported over the oceans (Abt, 2003). This dependency 
illustrates the importance of transportation for moving people to and from places of 
employment, and cargo, including food, fuel and just-in-time production materials from 
producer to consumer. Ports and waterways are "a key interest from the point of view of 
transport systems users" (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006, p. 538). As Zimmerman 
notes: "...infrastructure occupies a central position in the U.S. Economy (contributing 
about 10% of GDP). Small local terrorism attacks can have large regional and national 
economic impacts" (2005, p. 5). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been 
criticized in the media for spending "hundreds of millions of dollars to protect ports since 
Sept. 11 without sufficiently focusing on those that are most vulnerable, a policy that 
could compromise the nation's ability to better defend against terrorist attacks" (Lipton, 
2005, p. 1). Security measures must strike an appropriate balance between security and 
freedom to ensure rapid transit for perishable and seasonal goods (Saito, Guthmuller & 
DeWeert, 2005). Utilizing a method to manage and understand uncertainty of the risk of 
a terrorist attack may assist a decision-maker in improving security for critical 
infrastructure. 
The research provides three significant contributions to risk analysis in the underwater 
domain. First, it contributes to the body of knowledge by identifying and relating (i.e., 
mapping) the critical variables pertinent to the risk analysis for underwater terrorism. 
Second, this research expands the methodologies for the analysis of underwater terrorism 
risk. Finally, this research provides areas for future research in the critical path for 
managing and understanding uncertainty when evaluating the risk of an underwater 
terrorism attack. 
1.5 Key assumptions, limitations and delimitations 
1.5.1 Assumptions 
This research assumed that: 
• the relationship between the risk parameters are linear, 
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• the parameters demonstrated in an underwater attack conducted by the 
government were similar to those employed by an adversarial organization, 
• the current processes employed by the intelligence community would provide 
adequate vocabulary for the research, 
• the Adversary/Defender model is an open system relationship containing "more 
variables than we can comprehend at one time, or that some of the variables are 
subject to influences that we cannot control or predict" (Thompson, 2006, p. 6), 
• adversarial organizations use similar methods to recruit and train people 
regardless of the tactics, techniques or procedures employed, 
• an adversary operates under less restrictive norms of rationality than the defender, 
• an adversary is motivated by a consequence, 
• an adversary searches for vulnerability to achieve the desired consequence, 
• if a vulnerability is exploited, it will reasonably incur a consequence, and 
• the infrastructure under study is, in fact, critical. 
1.5.2 Limitations 
The interdependencies between the variables of the risk equation cannot be ignored. 
However, this research focused on the threat variable from the risk equation, as defined in 
Section 2.2.1, to reduce the scope of the research. This research did not consider how 
either vulnerability or consequence was determined. It did employ a multi-perspective 
view of the relationships between vulnerability and consequence with the threat element 
of the risk equation. 
The model testing, one aspect of confirming validity was fashioned in a less restrictive 
form "so that it covers a broader range of phenomena and is exposed to more 
opportunities for falsification" (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 22). However, to 
achieve significant internal validity, the model testing had a high degree of control, 
which, unfortunately, reduced the naturalistic conditions, thereby reducing the external 
validity (Cook & Campbell, 1983). A balance, based on the data population, was 
maintained in both developing and testing the models. 
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1.5.3 Delimitations 
To minimize the scope of the research, and provide a focus on analysis of the risk 
equation, this research did not: 
• explore how to measure vulnerabilities of attacked critical infrastructures, except 
as required for the interdependencies of the risk equation, 
• explore how to measure the consequence of a successful attack on critical 
infrastructure except as required for the interdependencies of the risk equation, 
and will be limited by considering only the external adversary. 
Runkel and McGrath (1972) identified three aspects that must be addressed when 
considering if research is generalizable. First, can the research methodology produce the 
same results under different conditions? Section 0 explains the process employed for the 
selection and analysis of the data. This methodology is generic in nature, fostering 
generalizability for any man-made threat and facilitating other researchers to change the 
research environment and observe variability, ensuring this research "covers a broader 
range of phenomena and is exposed to more opportunities for falsification" (King, 
Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 22). 
Second, Runkel and McGrath (1972) ask if the research design focused on measurement 
and not process. This research did not take the initial measurements but used and 
converted (qualitative to quantitative) existing data. The conversion of the data was 
conducted in the analysis of the cases and used the Malice spectrum outlined in Section 0. 
The conversion retained the context of the original data to enable exploration, specifically 
for research question four, what is the measure of risk, of possible alternative 
explanations that may exist for the causal relationships observed (Huitt, 1998). 
Runkel and McGrath's (1972) third aspect is the composition of the sample for the data 
analysis. Sample size, n, is vital in determining the confidence interval and confidence 
coefficient of statistical models and impacted the depth of the analysis (Mendenhall & 
Sincich, 1995). A larger n provides confidence for the inferences that are made from the 
data. However, n was limited by the availability of unclassified data and the expectation 
of utilizing two samples for the research - one as hypothesis testing and one sample for 
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methodology testing. The total sample size was n=51, but it was disaggregated into two 
samples, n=26 for Sample A and n=25 for Sample B. Sample A was larger because the 
statistical power desired was n=0.80 and the expected difference between the means of 
0.8 required a sample size of at least n=26. The composition of the two samples was 
dictated by the data sources and the methodology. Data were collected but not sorted. 
Once the total sample was documented, the sample was parsed into two samples and then 
sorted - to wit, the samples were generated randomly. 
The research was conducted from the perspective of the United States as the defender 
entity. The perspective of the research includes, but is not limited to, aspects such as 
resource allocation, rationality, scope and magnitude of the problem set, and the form of 
government. The research examines adversarial actions across numerous geographic 
areas, differing governments and over the 60 year time period that minimizes the impact 
of the research's perspective on generalizability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
An exploration of critical infrastructure protection from underwater (formally termed 
subsurface) attack begins with understanding the relationship between critical 
infrastructure and risk. A large part of the concept of risk is uncertainty, which will be 
explored later in this chapter. Parsing the problem further, there is uncertainty in the risk 
of maritime terrorism, more specifically, an underwater attack to critical infrastructure. 
An attack conducted underwater is a unique instance of terrorism with unique challenges 
including the environment, tactics used, techniques employed and the specialized 
equipment required. Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the alignment of these 
concepts and forms the basis for this review, illustrating the narrowing of focus from the 
generalized concerns of risk to specialized issues involved with the uncertainty in the 
analysis of a terrorist attack in the underwater environment. The following sections 








Figure 1: Path of the literature review 
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The context of this research is managing and understanding the risk of terrorism against 
critical infrastructure. Most definitions of critical infrastructure (CI) have common 
variables that point to physical structures that are absolutely necessary for the 
development and functioning of a society. The intent and spirit of much of the current 
literature are captured by four definitions: one is provided by the International Journal 
for Critical Infrastructures that defines critical infrastructures as: "...networks for the 
provision of telecommunication and information services, energy services (electrical 
power, natural gas, oil and heat), water supply, transportation of people and goods 
banking and financial services, government services and emergency services" (2004, p. 
np). This definition incorporates the variables of the basic services (e.g. water, sewer) for 
society, information and communication services for economic development and the 
systems that provides for basic government support. 
In the second definition, Moteff, Copeland and Fischer (2003) provide a more 
generalized definition in their report to Congress, which states that critical infrastructures 
are "infrastructures so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on defense or economic security" (p. 2). Although this definition 
includes infrastructure, it leaves the reader with an unclear explanation of the scope of the 
infrastructure under debate. Is it physical properties, data and information or perhaps 
other ethereal variables? It does make an interesting distinction that loss of the 
infrastructure would have an impact on defense, an element only implied in the Journal's 
definition previously provided. 
In both cases, the reader is left to debate the level of impact required to categorize a 
system as critical vice non-critical. Further, where do environmental consequences fall 
within the definition? Is loss of public confidence a factor when debating loss of 
government services or impacting defense or economic security? 
The United States government has several key documents that provide an additional 
definition of critical infrastructure. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, defines critical infrastructure as variables of the national 
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infrastructure that are "essential to the minimum operations" (Clinton, 1998, p. 1) for the 
national and economic security of the United States. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
clarified the definition and included virtual systems. It defines critical infrastructures as 
systems that are "so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety" (Critical Infrastructures Protection, 2001, p. 
401). The United States' military broadens the definition to include political, military, 
economic, social, infrastructure! and informational (PMESII) elements in a system-of-
systems approach to understanding the entire environment (SRI International, 2007). 
The definition of critical infrastructure is subjective because it must be scalable, and it 
depends on the context of the problem being analyzed. Therefore, for this research, 
critical infrastructure contains the following critical variables: physical structures and not 
the data or information contained within those structures; these structures must be 
absolutely necessary for the defense, the society or the economic security of the 
community served; and loss of the physical infrastructure would have a detrimental effect 
on the public confidence. Using these variables, the following definition is proposed for 
this research: 
Definition 1: Critical infrastructures are those facilities and their associated components 
that would cause considerable degradation of political, military, economic, social, 
infrastructural or informational services, or have a detrimental effect on the 
environment, in the event of a successful adversarial event. 
This definition includes chemical production plants or storage facilities, electric power 
generation or distribution facilities, transportation nodes or hazardous material nodes 
such as nuclear power plants or nuclear storage facilities. 
This definition contains an ambiguity which can be clarified within the context of the 
facilities discussed - "considerable degradation". To understand what considerable 
degradation is, the reader should include appropriate metrics within the context of the 
conversation. Johnson, Khater and Kuzak (2005) suggest metrics for critical 
infrastructure include public health and safety such as regulatory requirements, financial 
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impacts to society and corporations such as business interruptions, loss of public 
confidence, and environmental consequences. 
This definition also remains scalable, capable of being applied internationally, nationally 
or within a particular community. Scalability remains a vital variable of understanding 
critical infrastructure. From the perspective of a town planner, the water or electric 
delivery systems are part of the town's critical infrastructure. However, at the national 
level, that town's infrastructure may not be considered critical when compared to other 
facilities such as a transnational oil or gas pipelines or the telecommunications facilities 
that comprise the Global Information Grid. This research does not debate the merits of 
either scenario but develops a methodology for managing and understanding uncertainty 
regardless of how the analyst defines the scope of critical infrastructure. 
2.1. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the risk evaluation environment is a fundamental attribute that is, in a 
sense, the underlying cause for risk assessment, effectively bounded rationality - decision 
making without perfect information. Decision Makers distinguish "among three types of 
uncertainty: inadequate understanding, incomplete information, and undifferentiated 
alternatives" (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 149). Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) document at 
least 14 different ways that uncertainty is conceptualized including risk, ambiguity or 
conflict. They propose that "uncertainty in the context of action is a sense of doubt that 
blocks or delays action" (p. 150). Ayyub (2005), who developed an ignorance hierarchy, 
utilized a definition that starts with "reality is perceived as a continuum in its composition 
of objects, concepts and propositions" and builds through knowledge to uncertainty (p. 
15). 
Other authors approach uncertainty along various stages of an analysis process. For 
example, Argote (1982) provides a short summary for the beginning of the analysis 
process when she writes the "concept of [input uncertainty] draws on the work done in 
the areas of cybernetics and information theory (e.g., Wiener, 1948; Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949; Miller, 1953; Attneave, 1959) in which uncertainty is expressed as a 
function of the number of choices or alternatives in a given situation" (p. 422). 
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Many authors focus on mainly the process of the analysis and its applicable variables, 
only mentioning uncertainty as an afterthought. However, Macgill and Siu (2005) argue 
that "knowledge is limited and approximate. In the risk context, this argues for open 
consideration to be given to uncertainty and in particular how it is dealt with by the 
various constituencies involved with a risk issue" (p. 1107). They emphasize that 
certitude, a state of certainty, is a perception or degree of confidence a person has in 
his/her acquisition of true and valid knowledge, including a magnitude of scientific 
certainty. The Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment (COBP) defines uncertainty as 
"an inability to determine a variable value or system state (nature) or to predict its future 
evolution" (NATO, 2002, p. 249). The COBP makes an important point that when all the 
possible outcomes are known, including their associated probabilities, but the outcome of 
a specific instance is not known, then "there is a risk, in this case a known risk, 
associated with a particular outcome" (NATO, 2002, p. 249). For this research, the 
definition of uncertainty will assume a more systems based approach: 
Definition 2: Uncertainty is the lack of precise knowledge about a system or a given 
situation. 
2.1.1. Types of uncertainty 
The different types of uncertainty have been parsed in multiple ways (e.g., Ayyub, 2005; 
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Willis et al., 2005). This research will utilize the hierarchy, 
recreated in Figure 2, developed by Haimes (2004). It suggests that uncertainty can be 
broken down into variability and knowledge. It further parses variability into temporal, 
spatial and individual heterogeneity. Knowledge uncertainty is parsed into model, 
parameter and decision. The taxonomy appears to align with other taxonomies described 
in the literature, either directly or through interpretation by the reader. A closer 
examination of the types of uncertainty follows. 
2.1.1.1. Variability 
The aleatory uncertainty, labeled variability by Haimes (2004), is about the state of 
reality and about our knowledge of the state reality. Aleatory uncertainty is frequently 
used in a natural sense (e.g., earthquakes or points of landfalls for hurricanes) or in a 
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generic sense like the states of nature that can concern the actions of others (NATO, 
2002; Darby, 2006; Woo, 1999). Haimes (2004) clarifies variability when he states 
"variability occurs when the quantity of concern is not a specific value but rather a 
population of values" (p. 238). Variability includes the concept of ambiguity or 
"uncertainty associated with the likelihood of an event" (Darby, 2006, p. 135). 
The sub-elements of variability are complimentary but independent. Temporal variability 
is variability based on the dimension of time. It can be modified by spatial variability 
which is based on location, specifically geographic location (the reader can consider the 
case of a hurricane making landfall. The when and where of landfall is a variable that is 
constricted as the landfall event nears). The final variability factor that was described by 
Haimes (2004) and included in this research's taxonomy is individual heterogeneity. 
Similar to Haimes' (2004) application, this research views individual heterogeneity as 




Temporal Individual Spatial 
Heterogeneity 
Model Parameter Decision 
Figure 2: Sources of uncertainty (adapted from Haimes, 2004) 
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vice individual people and, which is a vital factor when representing populations for 
making assumptions about uncertainty. 
2.1.1.2. Knowledge 
In addition to the uncertainty manifest in reality, there is epistemic uncertainty, which is 
distinguished by decision makers as "inadequate understanding, incomplete information 
or undifferentiated alternatives" (Lipshitz & Straus, 1997, p. 149). This category of 
uncertainty, classified as knowledge uncertainty (Haimes, 2004) addresses uncertainty in, 
or caused by, our model, our parameters and our decision process and is discussed in 
subsequent paragraphs in this section. Knowledge uncertainty, frequently called 
epistemic uncertainty, is introduced by humans into the understanding of the event and is 
solely concerned with our understanding and interpretation of reality (Darby, 2006; Kelly 
& Smith, 2009). Knowledge uncertainty is related to non-specificity, which cannot be 
represented by a probability (Darby, 2006). The importance of understanding knowledge 
uncertainty is highlighted by Woo (2002) when he states: "Whatever the underlying 
theoretical foundation, given the dependence on the modus operandi of a terrorist 
organization, any risk calculation inevitably involves a number of subjective probability 
assignments, variability of which amplifies the epistemic uncertainty" (p. 16). 
Humans tend to order the concept of reality into a subconscious structure based on beliefs 
and feedback loops, commonly referred to as our model. Ordering allows humans to 
evaluate or manipulate data and to translate real-world observables into information 
(Kelly & Smith, 2009). The COBP (2002) uses model-based uncertainty and uncertainty 
of focus to encompass model uncertainty. Model-based uncertainty endeavors to answer 
if the underlying model is valid and representative of reality. Uncertainty of focus asks if 
the "assessment covers all the important factors and/or issues" (NATO, 2002, p. 254). 
Yu and Harris (2009) identify two types of input variables: regressive variables and 
model parameters. "Regressive variables are those that can be influenced by process 
design or by a control strategy. With model parameters, there are typically no 
opportunities to directly influence their variability" (p. 596). Regressive variables are a 
function of model-based uncertainty and may be caused or exacerbated by the 
assumptions that engineers or risk analysts invoke (NATO, 2002). 
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As noted in the previous paragraph, another category of uncertainty is within the 
parameters of the model created or our understanding of the model parameters and 
includes imprecision in measurement, censoring or interpretive errors (Haimes, 2004; 
Kelly & Smith, 2009; Macgill & Siu, 2005). Once a parameter is selected and coded into 
the model, there are usually limited opportunities to improve the parameter's 
inconsistency. The COBP (2002) calls this type of uncertainty parameter value 
uncertainty and introduces the "complexity of uncertain factors (i.e., their 
dimensionality)—when a sufficiently complex factor (e.g., scenarios or future 
technology) is uncertain, the team cannot expect to overview the set of all possible true 
states" (pp. 254-255). Reducing input uncertainty by expressing uncertainty as a function 
of the number of alternatives has a long history of research in cybernetics and 
information theory (e.g., Attneave, 1959; Miller, 1953; Shannon & Weaver, 1949; 
Wiener, 1948). In addition to the uncertainty within the parameter, there exists an 
"information theory [that suggests], as volume homogeneity increases, input uncertainty 
increases" (Argote, 1982, p. 426). 
Related to parameter uncertainty is the concept of vagueness. Vagueness is a situation 
where there is uncertainty how to develop the parameter to describe a value within an 
event. Vagueness is not usually represented by a probability function. Darby (2006) uses 
an example of a report that is in a box and the box is located in a room. We are certain 
that the report is in a specific box, and we know exactly where that box is located in the 
room. However, when asked if the box is in the center of the room there may be several 
answers: The first answer may be "no" if the box is located in a corner or touching a wall 
(value = 0). The second answer may be "yes" if the box is directly in the center of the 
room (value = 1). However, the third answer could be "maybe" if there is some doubt as 
to the actual center of the room (value 0 < x > 1) (Darby, 2006, pp. 23-25). Darby (2006) 
asserts that fuzzy sets address vagueness and differ from crisp sets because they include 
the concept of partial membership. 
The third category of uncertainty related to the interpretation of reality is decision 
uncertainty that "surrounds the implementation of analytical results into actual decisions 
and policy" (Haimes, 2004, p. 250) or, as an output of the analytical process, may result 
16 
in "undifferentiated alternatives" (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 149). Decision 
uncertainty is post-analysis and will not be examined in this research. 
2.1.1.3. Sources of uncertainty 
One source of uncertainty in risk analysis of terrorist attacks is the variability and error in 
the estimate of threat. The existing foundations for information regarding the parameters 
that determine what the current terrorist threat is are intelligence estimates, historical 
analysis, and expert judgment, which are not deterministic in nature and force the model 
to use approximations to quantify them (Willis, et al., 2005). As an example, using 
estimates from historical analysis is very difficult since it is very rare for the 
circumstances surrounding an event to remain the same at all times and the causal 
connections are not usually fully understood (Jenelius, et al., 2006). 
The second source of uncertainty is how the value of consequence is determined. 
Because of uncertainty, policy analysis may rely on heuristic estimates that may have a 
low probability of being correct (or, the reciprocal: a high probability of being incorrect). 
The estimates may provide a concrete estimate of risk but it is not linked to the risk 
reality (Willis, et al., 2005). Methods for planning under uncertainty currently exist (see 
Bauer, 2002; Davis, 1994; Lempert, Popper & Bankes, 2003) and can assist with 
determining risk. 
In the previous discussion of risk and uncertainty there is a common thread pertinent to 
the research questions and eloquently argued by Darby (2006): "A terrorist attack is not a 
random event; it involves a specific scenario that is selected, planned, and implemented 
by the adversary" (p. 9). Since the terrorist attack is not a random event there are 
difficulties in developing a quantitative risk matrix due to the uncertainties involved 
(Jones, Lyford, Qazi, Solan, & Haimes, 2003). Therefore the use of random modeling 
and methods of risk analysis based on randomness is flawed. Darby (2006) continues 
that "terrorist acts are intentional and an evaluation of them involves considerable 
epistemic uncertainty. Traditional probabilistic risk analysis techniques have difficulty 
modeling the risk from terrorist's acts due to the inherently large epistemic uncertainty" 
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(p. 12). Scenarios involving large epistemic uncertainty in the analysis of threat form the 
keystone for this research. 
2.1.2. Uncertainty and reality 
If humans were capable of perfect knowledge, then our perception of the world would be 
equivalent to reality. However, reality is fluid and humans have yet to acquire perfect 
knowledge, which introduces uncertainty. Figure 3 is an illustration of how an aspect of 
reality can develop an error cone based on our description of that reality, or our 
parameters. Furthermore, our working portrayal of reality, essentially our model (either 
physical, virtual or mental) develops its own potential cone of error. These cones 
represent the various types of uncertainty that will be discussed in the next few sections 
and are illustrative of how uncertainty is derived or manifest from reality. 
REALITY 
Figure 3: Planes of uncertainty 
18 
2.1.3. Dependence 
Frequently, uncertainty is driven, or increased by, dependence because of the relationship 
between the entities or states that can increase the breadth of the fault tree dramatically, 
and is context-sensitive for each specific scenario. Dependence is context-sensitive and 
becomes more complicated for specific threats than for random threats. Consider the 
impact of copycat attacks seen in domestic and international terrorism or the increase in 
attack frequency around holy days in the Middle East. Consider too, the dependencies 
which affect vulnerability, for example, Zimmerman (2005) discusses the 1998 water 
main break in New York city, which caused a street to collapse and a gas line to rupture. 
When addressing threat, the analyst or modeler must account for dependence. Darby 
2006) incorporates dependence by using a multi-perspective model (Adversary/ 
Defender) and stresses that dependence is far more complicated for terrorist acts than for 
random acts (e.g. earthquake or equipment failure) because if one attack scenario is 
attempted and succeeds in causing a significant consequence then the frequency of the 
attacks may increase as success encourages more attacks (e.g., road side improvised 
explosive devices, or IEDs). The frequency of attacks can also increase based on world 
events as terrorist groups obtain more recruits based on actual or perceived injustices by 
the United States. 
2.2. Risk 
Generically, risk is the probability of the occurrence of a specific possible event and is 
frequently associated with negative outcomes such as the possibility of suffering harm or 
loss (NATO, 2002) but may also include the possibility of not achieving the objective; an 
assessment of the probability of failure; an uncertain future scenario; or a perception of 
consequential pain (NATO, 2002 pp. E-l, E-2). A specific definition of risk has not yet 
been accepted across disciplines, as noted by Macgill and Siu (2005) who identified 26 
different technical and social definitions of risk, but the concept has evolved to the point 
of general understanding when discussed among practitioners of risk management. 
Pertinent to this research, Willis, et al. (2005) assert that "there is not a consistent and 
shared definition of terrorism risk" (p. vii). They further insist that there is "no existing 
framework for selecting and combining risk indicators" and lament that the methods for 
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testing the accuracy and the probability distribution of risk has received little attention (p. 
vii). An examination of risk definitions reveals a commonality that highlights the core 
concept of risk; essentially that risk has inherent consequences; and that "risk is an 
intrinsically dynamic and unstable phenomenon" (Macgill & Siu, 2005, p 1119). 
At perhaps the most generic level, risk is defined as "...the uncertainty of outcomes [and] 
it is best measured in terms of probability distribution functions" (Jorion, 2001, as cited 
in Samson, Reneke & Wiecek, 2009, p. 559). The context of this definition is financial 
risk, specifically market volatility. From this definition several points can be ascertained. 
First, uncertainty exists and must be managed. Second, the financial community is 
focused on the outcome of the uncertainty - the end result, not the cause or the measures 
in place to mitigate. A final point is that risk can be measured and quantified as a 
distribution function, implying there is sufficient historical data to create accurate 
distributions - a serious concern with underwater terrorism that has less than 100 events 
on public record. 
Shifting from a qualitative perspective to a quantitative discussion, risk is frequently 
defined as the combination of the probability of an event and the consequences of the 
event or, mathematically, a convolution of variables (Daneshkhah, 2004; ISO, 2009; 
Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006). Kaplan and Garrick advance a two-variable 
definition when they discuss their risk triplet approach where each scenario has two 
variables: the probability of the scenario, p(S,), and the consequence, C, of that scenario 
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). The risk triplet (3-tuple) is {Si, p(Sj), C|Sj}, where Sj is the Ith 
scenario, and i is merely the number given to identify a specific scenario (Kaplan, 2002; 
Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). 
Some authors have expanded the concept of the probability of the event to include the 
threat and vulnerability elements while retaining the consequence (Darby, 2004, 2006; 
Moteff, 2004). They have utilized mathematical notation to form the following 
definition: 
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Equation 1: Risk defined with three probabilities: threat, vulnerability and consequence 
Risk (R) = p(Threat (T)) * p(Vulnerability (V)) * p(Consequence (C)) 
or 
R = p(T)*p(V)*p(C) 
Where the symbol represent convolution, not multiplication. 
Taking the mathematical concept one step further, and providing an avenue for managing 
the probability distributions in risk, Willis, et al. (2005) proposed a measure of terrorism 
risk as "the expected consequence of an existent threat, which for a given target, attack 
mode, and damage type can be expressed as: 
Equation 2: Risk defined as expected consequence 
Risk = p(attack occurs) * 
p(attack results in damage | attack occurs) * 
E(damage | attack occurs and results in damage)" (p. 10) 
Again, the represent convolution. 
Similar to Equation 1, this definition, strongly rooted in probability theory, still harkens 
back to the basics: probability of an event exists and consequences can be associated with 
that event - the common theme observed across all disciplines researched. 
Using probability functions for underwater terrorism is problematic because the amount 
of data available to produce a probability distribution is scarce. Recall that probability is 
used to represent the frequency an event occurs on the state of knowledge. For example, 
probability as a frequency is defined as the number of successes divided by the number of 
attempts of a specific trial. In one of the common textbook examples for frequentist 
probability, the example of a coin toss is given where the probability of getting heads on 
a fair-coin flip is 50%. However, this measure is dimensionless (it has no specific time 
duration) and does not provide limits for response to a threat. 
When probability is used as a measure of a state of knowledge (known as Bayesian 
probability), it is measuring the uncertainty inherent in the state of knowledge. When 
examining the state of knowledge uncertainty can be one of two types: aleatory 
21 
uncertainty or epistemic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is due to uncertainty in the 
problem itself, and is often called random or inherent uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty 
comes directly from the state of knowledge the observer or participant has (Darby, 2006). 
However, in the current methods of determining probability, each method assumes 
attacks are ergodic, that is, from observing past events one can accurately predict the 
future. This approach is flawed because risk evolves over time as adversary's resources 
and intentions change (e.g., motivational changes, adapting to defenders tactics or law 
enforcement activity). Jenelius, Petersen and Mattson (2006) emphasize that: 
Estimating the probabilities of extreme events such as natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks is very difficult. The probabilities are predicted from 
historical data, which implies that the circumstances around the event 
remain the same at all times and that all causal connections are known, (p. 
540) 
Each of the previous definitions contains variables of a widely used definition of risk and 
is adopted as the definition for this research in the following form: risk is the product of 
threat, vulnerability and consequence (Darby, 2006; Moteff, 2004; Willis, et al., 2005) or 
more precisely: 
Equation 3: This research's definition of risk 
Risk (R) = Threat (T) * Vulnerability (V) * Consequence (C) 
or 
Definition 3: Risk 
R = TVC 
The difference between this definition and Equation 1 is the basis on probability. This 
definition convolutes the values of threat, vulnerability and consequence independent of 
how the values are determined. Each variable will be discussed in more detail in Sections 
0,0 and 0. 
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2.2.1. Threat 
Threat is the variable that defines the intentions and capabilities of the attacker. In the 
literature, threat has many different definitions and is addressed in diverse ways. For 
example, Haimes and Horowitz (2004) define threat as "a potential intent to cause harm 
or damage to a system by adversely affecting its states" (p. 34). In 2005, Willis, et al., 
(2005) argue that threats are "external, dynamic forces acting on targets or infrastructure" 
(p. 51). Note the focus on external forces, thereby eliminating one potential area of 
threat: internal collaborator or actors. They contend that "threats to a target can be 
measured as the probability that a specific target is attacked in a specific way during a 
specified period" (Willis, et al., 2005, p. xvi) and is written as: 
Equation 4: Threat as a probability that an attack occurs 
Threat = p(attack occurs) 
Interestingly, this measure details a certain type of attack on a specific target, which is an 
unrealistic constraint on the threat analysis because of the large uncertainty that exists in 
the terrorist threat environment. 
However, Willis et al. (2005) parse threat into intent and capability, something that is 
agreed upon by more than one author (Moteff, 2004; Roper, 1999; Willis et al., 2005) and 
the intelligence community, in general. "The key to quantifying the threat (target, 
weapon, and delivery system) of a terrorist attack is being able to account for varying 
levels of uncertainty about the likelihood of the threat" (Garrick, et al., 2004, p. 137). 
Because the intelligence community is focused on detecting and thwarting an attack, they 
usually view threat in terms of groups of attackers. Willis's (2005) attack-type 
perspective (p. 6) brings increased utility to analysts and planners because it focuses on 
what targets are threatened by what type of attack vice being focused on the whom and 
the why of the attack. This approach is aligned with the engineering communities' 
practice of risk analysis (see Ayyub, 2005; Pate-Cornell, 2005; von Winterfeldt & 
Rosoff, 2005). 
Other perspectives on the variables contained in the definition of threat include 
motivation, capability, opportunity and impact (Vidalis, 2004) or the "combination of an 
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asset, a vulnerability and an attacker" (Bauer, 2002, p. 1). Bauer (2002) asserts an asset 
is anything the defender wishes to protect and defines attackers, occasionally called 
"actors", as anyone, to include drug cartels, other government agencies or industrial spies 
(p. 3). 
For this research, the definition of threat will combine several key elements noted above. 
The intent or desire to do harm will be taken as motivation. The capability of an 
aggressor must also be considered, for without a means to do harm, there is no threat. 
However, the intent or the capability may not be completely known even to the aggressor, 
a fact which does not diminish the actual threat to the facility but merely indicates the 
level of planning conducted thus far. An important argument not noted in the previous 
discussion is the damage caused by non-events. The value of a well planned and 
executed public relations attack (e.g., releasing photographs of aggressors within a 
nuclear facility without actually damaging that facility) should not be underestimated. 
The effect would be very similar to a successful physical attack in influencing the 
government and the associated public. Using these concepts, this research will define 
threat as: 
Definition 4: Threat is the intent and the capability of an external aggressor to adversely 
affect a target, e.g., a critical infrastructure. 
In the previous discussion for threat, a common thread exists that is eloquently argued by 
Darby (2006): "A terrorist attack is not a random event; it involves a specific scenario 
that is selected, planned, and implemented by the adversary" (p. 9). Since this statement 
is taken to be true, then the use of random modeling and methods of risk analysis based 
on randomness is flawed. He continues that "terrorist acts are intentional and an 
evaluation of them involves considerable epistemic uncertainty. Traditional probabilistic 
risk analysis techniques have difficulty modeling the risk from terrorist's acts due to the 
inherently large epistemic uncertainty" (Darby, 2006, p. 12). Additionally, this research 
will not assume, similar to Levitin and Ben-Haim's (2008) approach to the evaluation of 
risk, that an attack will occur, to wit that p(attack occurs) = 1.0. 
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This theme echoes throughout the current body of literature. Only in the past few years 
have academia and industry attempted to resolve uncertainty in threat analysis using a 
systematic and robust methodology (Bernhardt, 2004; Darby, 2006; Steinberg, 2005). 
The uncertainty gap that exists between the current state and future states is exasperated 
by the non-ergodic nature of human action and the incomplete knowledge of the analyst 
or facility operator. Current methods, as outlined in Section 2.3, frequently force the 
analyst to make epistemic statements about human behavior or attacker capabilities that 
result in confusion for decision makers or an extraneous commitment of resources to 
include operationalizing threat assessment to the tactical level (Suzic, 2005). 
2.2.2. Vulnerability 
The second variable of risk is vulnerability, which is a variable that defines the 
characteristics of a facility or critical infrastructure. As with threat, a review of the 
literature indicates there is not a universally accepted definition for vulnerability. 
Holmgren (2004) defines vulnerability as "sensitivity to threats and hazards" (p. iii). 
Jenelius, Petersen and Mattson (2006) provide a more specific definition that decomposes 
vulnerability into two variables: probability of a hazardous event [threat -ed] and what 
they call "exposure" which contains "the consequences of the event in a certain place" (p. 
538). Willis, et al., (2005) provide a measure of vulnerability as "the probability that 
damages (where damages may involve fatalities, injuries, property damage, or other 
consequences) occur, given a specific attack type, at a specific time, on a given target, or, 
Equation 5: Vulnerability as a probability of damage given an attack 
Vulnerability = p(attack results in damage] attack occurs)" (p. 8). 
Given the dependence on the occurrence of a specific attack type at a specific time and 
the uncertainty of risk analysis of a vast array of threats, developing the matrix of 
vulnerabilities for a critical facility or infrastructure can be bewildering. 
For this research, vulnerability will focus on the critical infrastructure's security 
techniques, tactics and procedures. To wit: 
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Definition 5: Vulnerability is the set of critical infrastructure-specific 
opportunities available for an adversary to exploit in conducting operations, 
including reconnaissance and operational attacks. 
Borrowing from theory advanced by HellstrOm (2007) for cyber systems, the critical 
infrastructure vulnerability analysis experiences increased complexity because the 
various systems are usually designed and fielded at different times (a temporal 
dimension) and in different geographical places (a spatial dimension). HellstrSm 
proposes four principles for a vulnerability reduction framework which could be 
generalized as an aspect of this research: (1) functional interlocking - the systems' 
functions are dependent on functions of other external systems. (2) Temporal 
embeddedness - piecemeal additions and improvements introduce vulnerability by 
building onto or over existing flaws. (3) Critical socio-technical tipping-points -
management of a critical system should have a focus on intervention which does not 
disrupt social functionality (e.g., will the medicine kill the patient?) and (4) dynamic and 
reversive effects - critical points of large socio-technical systems are dynamic and fluid. 
(2007). 
2.2.3. Consequence 
The third variable of risk is frequently called the "so-what" variable: consequence. 
Interestingly, consequence is frequently assumed to be intuitive - the end result of the 
attack on the infrastructure would cause substantial impact to society served, and is not 
given rigorous exploration in the literature. Willis et al. (2005) probably best define 
consequence as "the magnitude and type of damage resulting, given a successful terrorist 
attack" (p. 8) and provide a measure for consequence as "the expected magnitude of 
damage (e.g., deaths, injuries, or property damage to a specific target) or, 
Equation 6: Consequence as a probability of damage given an attack occurs 
Consequence = p(damage | attack occurs and results in damage)" (p. 9). 
This measure is the basis for this research's definition of consequence, accordingly, 
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Definition 6: Consequence is the total subjective value of damage inflicted as the result of 
an attack on critical infrastructure. 
This definition includes the residual impact from that damage or loss of life such as loss 
of income or potential future income. 
2.2.4. Relationship between risk and uncertainty 
The concepts of uncertainty and risk have a tenuous relationship, not just in engineering, 
but also across many different disciplines. In their review of the different perspectives on 
uncertainty and risk, Samson, et al., (2009) provide a helpful figure, recreated as Figure 
4, which illustrates the relationship between risk and uncertainty currently encapsulated 
by the body of knowledge. The four leaves in this tree represent significant differences in 
opinion among authors and have seen numerous papers authored to resolve the conflicts. 
Substantial support for the concept that epistemic uncertainty is risk exists across the 
literature, especially from the economic and finance communities (Samson, et al., 2009). 
For example, Mehr and Cammack (1961) assert, "...risk is defined as uncertainty" (as 
cited in Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559). Several authors have used risk and uncertainty 
interchangeably (e.g., Magee, 1961; Philippe, 2001). However, research efforts outside of 
the finance community appear to be focused on parsing risk and uncertainty as different 
concepts. 
Uncertainty Is risk 
Uncartaln(>yaidtlak«i»<l(ip«ndMit 
Figure 4: Relationship between uncertainty and risk 
(adapted from Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559) 
As early as 1901, economists were separating risk and uncertainty, especially Willett, 
who defined risk as the "objectified uncertainty regarding the occurrence of an 
undesirable event" (as cited by Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559). He asserted that epistemic 
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uncertainty of the subjective nature resulted "from the imperfection of man's knowledge" 
(Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559). Bedford and Cooke (2001) also used uncertainty in their 
definition of risk explaining that risk is really comprised of two elements: hazards and 
uncertainty. The division of uncertainty and risk as different concepts requires a further 
discussion of their dependencies: are risk and uncertainty independent? 
The literature has examples that if uncertainty and risk are different concepts, it can also 
be argued that they are independent. Pfeffer (1956) believed that risk and uncertainty 
were counterparts of one another and that they differed by how they were measured. He 
saw risk being measured by objective probability and uncertainty, which he defined as a 
"state of the mind" being measured by subjective belief (Pfeffer, 1956 as cited in 
Samson, et al., 2009, p. 560). The focus on the state of the analyst's mind supports the 
linkage to epistemic uncertainty. Subjective belief is echoed in game theory where risk is 
defined as an action, which could lead to a specific set of distinct outcomes, but 
uncertainty's set of outcomes is potentially unknown or meaningless (Luce & Raffia, 
1957). 
The final two leaves, from the tree shown in Figure 4, the children branches of the 
assertion that uncertainty and risk are dependent, have received considerable attention. 
The first assertion is that uncertainty and risk are dependent and the dependency does not 
imply that uncertainty depends on risk (Crowe & Horn, 1967), but that risk depends on 
uncertainty (Macgill & Siu, 2005). This assertion can be seen in articles written for 
engineering safety (Helton, Johnson, Oberkampf & Sallaberry, 2006; Moller & Hansson, 
2008; Rao, Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2007; Yu & Harris, 2009); terrorism risk 
analysis (Darby, 2004; Kaplan, 2002; Willis, et al., 2005); human decision analysis 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) and transportation (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattsson, 2006). 
Perhaps the greatest single argument that illustrates that uncertainty gives rise to risk is 
the concept of removing all epistemic uncertainty - if a researcher had perfect knowledge 
then there would be no risk because all the variables would be known for a time period. 
Even without perfect knowledge the relationship between risk and epistemic uncertainty 
can be explained by Willett (1901) when he asserts that uncertainty is greatest when the 
degree of probability for risk is equal to one half. The researcher has no indication of 
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what the outcome will be because the probability of any outcome is equal (Willett, 1901). 
However, if the researcher can decrease uncertainty, even by the slightest, then the 
impact on risk would be to either increase or decrease the risk probability (Willett, 1901). 
How does one measure what one does not yet know? The concept of measurement as it 
applies to epistemic uncertainty and risk is relative to the term in question. Epistemic 
uncertainty is based on what the researcher does not know: it is a state of the mind, not a 
state of the world (PfefFer, 1956). However, the units of measure and the upper and 
lower bounds are either known or can be derived by additional research; albeit, the range 
may exceed the tolerance of the model in use. Risk, on the other hand, can be measured 
based on its expected value and the anticipated consequences (Daneshkhah, 2004; Kelly 
and Smith, 2009). This value may be comprised of parameters which are subject to 
uncertainty, leaving the value of the risk measurement to be suspect and only as good as 
the uncertainty analysis which is applied to the parameters. 
The ability to quantify epistemic uncertainty and risk is still one of the key areas open for 
debate. Most authors agree that risk and uncertainty can be quantified (Barker & Haimes, 
2008; Daneshkhah, 2004; Darby 2004; Helton, et al., 2006; Kelly & Smith, 2009; M6ller 
& Hanson, 2008; Phillippe, 2001; Rao, et al., 2007; Willis, et al., 2005). However, the 
quantification of epistemic uncertainty is usually in the form of expert opinion or 
probabilistic estimates, and it lacks definitive repeatable answers. The use of fuzzy logic, 
fuzzy sets and other tools intended to articulate and quantify epistemic uncertainty has 
improved the ability to quantify this type of uncertainty (Darby, 2004). Once quantified, 
both uncertainty and risk are applied to various methodologies in an attempt to develop 
probability distributions. 
Probability distributions for risk and uncertainty allow researchers to make estimates 
about the frequency of occurrences for events. Little debate exists in the literature 
concerning risk distributions. However, distributions related to epistemic uncertainty 
have some concerns with many authors believing it can be done (Barker & Haimes, 2008; 
Daneshkhah, 2004; Helton, et al., 2006; Kelly & Smith, 2009; Phillippe, 2001; Rao, et al. 
2007; Willis, et al., 2005); and some authors believing it cannot or should not be done 
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(Darby, 2004, 2006; M6ller & Hanson, 2008). Quantifying and distributing rare events 
are difficult using probability or statistics. By the very nature of probability and 
statistics, a large population is required in order to have significant confidence in the 
distribution as a tool for probability. In many cases the use of simulations, including 
Monte Carlo, can minimize this disparity. However, any quantification or distribution 
based on a historic analysis must take into account that the values are only truly accurate 
when all the parameters are the same over a specified time period for both the historic 
event and the sought-after prediction. 
Discussion of the uncertainty distribution curve has a serious detractor - what happens 
when all the outcomes are not known because of epistemic uncertainty? Darby (2004, 
2006) has developed ways to mitigate ambiguity and vagueness. By ambiguity, Darby 
(2006) attempts to resolve which crisp set (traditional sets in set theory) has the correct 
answer. Whereas in vagueness, Darby (2004, 2006) is trying to resolve a lack of 
sharpness for a fuzzy set - in other words - there is epistemic uncertainty in the set 
membership; and members may have partial set membership. 
2.3. Risk management in terrorism scenarios 
The presence of risk necessitates risk management for mitigation of the effects that risk 
may have on a complex system. Risk management in the underwater environment 
requires processes that can be 
applied to asymmetric warfare, in which elusive, secretive, and 
decentralized threats engage in loosely coordinated, difficult to detect 
behaviors. Capturing their behaviors through observation gathered by a 
diverse collection of sensors is a daunting task fraught with uncertainty. 
(Costa, Herencia-Zapana & Laskey, 2012, p. 715) 
Examinations of the current methods for risk management indicate there are 
predominantly three approaches employed: first is to essentially reduce the uncertainty 
that underlies the risk; second is to mitigate the risk; and third is to accept and 
communicate the nature of the risk (NATO, 2002). 
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Within the United States government several agencies have responsibilities for maritime 
terrorism prevention and response. The FBI has authority based in many statues and 
directives. The Department of Homeland Security, with both the U.S. Customs' and 
Border Patrol (CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard, are tasked with preventing terrorists from 
using cargo containers to smuggle people or weapons of mass destruction into the ports. 
The Coast Guard is assigned as the lead federal agency responsible for port security 
(Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002) and uses a Maritime Security Risk 
Assessment Model (MSRAM) that utilizes Equation 2, from Section 0, taxonomy and 
metrics to measure risk at various levels of detail. Additionally, MSRAM is used by the 
Department of Homeland Security to evaluate maritime counter terrorism grant programs 
(Edmonson, 2006). 
Numerous industry-specific evaluation approaches for protection of critical infrastructure 
have been fielded by various industry organizations (e.g., NEI or EPRI), the government 
(e.g., NRC, DOE or DHS) or international associations (e.g., IAEA) for nuclear facilities 
(Edmonson, 2006; EPRI, 2003; IAEA, 2003; U.S. NRC, 2008). For example, the oil and 
chemical industry has AIChE/CCPS. Regardless of the industry or the estimating entity, 
no method adequately addresses the uncertainty in the threat variable, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of any associated risk management methodology. Furthermore, the various 
risk management methods can be parsed into categories based upon the metrics used, 
generally defined as simple indicator, event-based or aggregate (Willis, et al., 2005). 
2.3.1. Simple indicator 
The simple indicator methodology uses understandable metrics and widely available data 
to form simple indicators such as population-based indicators that correlate consequence 
to population and threat to population density. The metrics for simple-indicators are 
usually well understood by policy makers; however, simple indicators do not adequately 
reflect the relationships between threat, vulnerability and consequence (Willis, et al, 
2005). For example, in 2006, Patterson and Apostolakis presented a methodology that 
was focused on vulnerability based on stakeholder input but did not address the threat 
variable. It continued the work of Apostolakis and Lemon (2005) on mean cut sets (mcs) 
that requires a value to be assigned to them. The process of value assignment requires an 
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evaluation of the conditional probability that terrorists would successfully attack a given 
mcs. Because value assignment is extremely difficult to do, many authors separate the 
vulnerability from the conditional probability of a successful attack. 
Darby (2006) developed a model which adequately reflects the relationships between the 
variables in the risk equation when he applied "non-probabilistic techniques to an overall 
evaluation of risk from acts of terrorism, including the likelihood of attack" (p. 9) in his 
Adversary/Defender model. He uses belief/plausibility measures from the 
Dempster/Schafer theory of evidence to represent uncertainty as a means to capture both 
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty by using simplistic variables that are reduced to 
independent probabilities. Darby (2006) built dependence into the model by establishing 
the Adversary model on the attackers' goal of maximizing consequence and the 
defenders' goal to minimize risk. He suggests the model could be improved by the 
probability measures being modified by Bayesian update techniques. Bayes' theorem has 
been used in methods such as probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) and probabilistic safety 
analysis (PSA) (Roland & Moriarity, 1983). 
Bayes' theorem can be used to quantify uncertainty by representing all decisions with 
precise probabilities "since the rational decision-maker always, at least implicitly, assigns 
a probability value to each potential outcome" (Mailer & Hansson, 2008, p. 777). These 
probability values essentially represent the decision maker's lack of knowledge, one of 
the categories of uncertainty. Garrick, et al. (2004), assert that in a Bayesian construct 
"uncertainty refers to the parameters that are used to measure risk and how these 
parameters represent uncertainties in information and modeling" (p. 141). A serious 
concern for applying the Bayesian approach is epistemic uncertainty, which by its very 
nature, may not be reducible to a unique probability. This constraint has contributed to 
the demand for including non-probabilistic epistemic uncertainty into the analysis 
(M5ller & Hansson, 2008). 
In addition to the difficulty in quantifying a decision maker's lack of knowledge, there is 
also the difficulty in quantifying other qualitative parameters - like target prioritization. 
Woo (2002) urges invoking Fechner's Law (also called Weber-Fechner's Law or 
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Weber's Law) "which states that an arithmetic progression in perceptions requires a 
geometrical progression in their stimuli" (p. 14). Fechner's Law is usually applied in 
cases where the magnitude of the sensation is not discriminated with near absolute 
certainty (Shigemoto, 2002). Another theory, that is closely related, is Steven's Power 
Law, which describes the relationship between the magnitude of a stimulus and its 
perceived intensity. Steven's Power Law is usually used where the magnitude of the 
sensation is discriminated with some certainty (Smelser & Baltes, 2001). The application 
of Steven's Power Law permits a simple indicator understandable metric for decision 
makers but, in truth, the theory is based on physical stimulus and not societal reactions. 
2.3.2. Event-based 
Event-based models, like the RMS Terrorism Risk Model employed by the insurance 
industry, provide a significant improvement in detailed analysis, including sensitivity 
analysis, and extend across multiple types of events or multiple targets. Frequently the 
models will include expert judgment, which improves accuracy in describing the details 
but may force the model to be populated with estimated parameters thereby increasing 
uncertainty. Event-based methods provide a means of overcoming the arbitrariness of 
simple indicators of risk, which rely on presumptive correlated relationships (Willis, et 
al., 2005). As a derivative of the event-based model, Levitin and Ben-Haim (2008) 
introduce a model that uses a universal generating function with probabilities and 
probability vectors representing attacker values to focus on damage caused to a complex 
system by intentional attack. 
Koonce, Apostolakis & Cook (2008) propose a methodology based on the MIT Risk 
Ranking methodology to conduct a systematic development of the ranking of their 
variables, principally intent, capability and resources, within a bulk power grid for both 
random acts and deliberate acts, which is based on stakeholder input. They assert "the 
risk assessment of infrastructures presents additional difficulties due to their diffuse 
nature" (p. 171) and note that Apostolakis & Lemon's (2005) work "...assumes a 'minor' 
level of threat to be present" (p. 171) which is an assumption that drives security costs 
upward regardless of the actual threat (which may, in fact, be non-existent). This 
assumption is also echoed in Johnson, Khater and Kuzak's (2005) advice to "assume the 
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facility is a credible target" (p. 8). They suggest one area for additional work is 
identification and modeling of more specific users groups on the power grid to better 
establish the consequence on users. 
2.3.3. Aggregate estimator 
The third method, introduced by Willis, et al., (2005) is called the aggregate estimator 
method and is based on practices from economic forecasting that aggregates information 
from multiple models or experts. However, Willis, et al.'s (2005) methodology is not the 
only aggregated methodology currently used. Sandia National Laboratories Vulnerability 
Assessment Methodology for Chemical Facilities (VAM-CF) considers risk as "a function 
of the severity of consequences of an undesired event, the likelihood of an adversary 
attack, and the likelihood of adversary success..." (Jaeger, 2002, p. 15). Prior to 
completing the vulnerability assessments the threat must be described. The VAM-CF 
uses type of adversary, tactics, and adversary capabilities, which are defined as number of 
adversaries, weapons, equipment and transportation. Jaeger (2002) then explains that 
"the potential for attack is determined based on the existence, capability, history/intent 
and targeting... [as well as] the attractiveness of the potential target" (p. 17). 
2.4. Underwater terrorism 
This research focuses on the threat of underwater terrorism, itself a subset of maritime 
terrorism, within the context of critical infrastructure; thus, a clear definition of 
underwater terrorism is necessary. Defining underwater terrorism is a difficult task since 
over 100 definitions of terrorism exist that spans over 20 definitional variables (Laqueur, 
1999; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Examining the basic concepts within the United 
States, the United States Code defines international terrorism as activities that, according 
to law, would be criminal and involve violent or dangerous actions intended to influence 
or intimidate the government or its citizens (Crimes & Criminal Procedures, 2006). 
Inherent in that definition are mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. 
The U.S. Department of Defense states terrorism is the "unlawful use of violence or 
threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies...often motivated by 
religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that 
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are usually political" (Joint Doctrine Division, 2010, p. 368). Note that both definitions 
contain the key point that terrorism is violence intended to influence the government to 
change its policies. 
Lorenz (2007) focuses the definition on maritime terrorism when he proposes maritime 
terrorism is "the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its 
passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facility, or if the purpose is solely a platform for 
political ends" (p. 4). Lorenz's definition does not address piracy, which can be 
differentiated from terrorism by its motivation: piracy is criminally motivated and 
maritime terrorism is politically motivated (Greenberg, et al., 2006). Motivation is the 
fundamental difference necessary for the definition of maritime terrorism that will be 
used in this research: 
Definition 7: Maritime terrorism is the premeditated use of violence or coercion (such as 
hijacking a ship and holding hostages without hurting anyone) within the marine 
environment to influence government behavior for political or ideological gain. 
According to the RAND database on terrorism, only 0.37% of the terrorist incidents from 
January 1968 until March 18, 2008 were maritime related (RAND Worldwide Incident 
Terrorism Database, 2008). Analysts assume the low number of maritime security 
incidents can be attributed to the high level of expense, training and complex technical 
capabilities necessary to successfully conduct a maritime mission (Medalia, 2005; 
Richardson, 2004). The difficulties specifically include acquiring maritime vehicles or 
equipment, specialized maritime skills, and waterproof weapons or explosives. Given the 
value for the dollar, maritime attacks usually have a low ratio of benefit to cost and they 
are often abandoned in favor of other operations. 
Several terrorist groups are considered to have significant maritime capabilities including 
the Middle Eastern Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Fattah, Hezbollah, and the South 
East Asian Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Lorenz, 2007). An example of a successful maritime terrorist 
attack is the small craft suicide attack on the USS Cole, on October 12, 2000. A 35-foot 
boat, loaded with explosives, pulled alongside the Cole while it was refueling in Aden, 
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Yemen and exploded, killing 17 sailors and injuring 47 more. The attack resulted in 
$250 million in damages and required 18 months for repairs (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). 
Although the incidence of maritime terrorism, in relation to other forms of terrorism, is 
relatively low and the incidence of underwater terrorism is even lower, amounting to a 
handful of documented incidents; history belies the threat as underwater terrorism is a 
becoming an attractive alternative to terrorist organizations. One example is Abdul al-
Rahim al-Nasheri, sometimes called the Prince of the Sea, who was the chief of 
operations for al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula until November 2002. He based his 
operations on four variables, one of which was possessing underwater demolition teams 
(Richardson, 2004). The grave consequences associated with successful underwater 
attacks increase the attractiveness of this method for al-Nasheri and other terrorists. 
Underwater terrorism also offers other benefits including the ability to operate undetected 
and the difficulty of defending against attacks. Over the past ten years, advances have 
been made in underwater sensors, but the underwater environment still remains a difficult 
area to monitor because of the limited visibility, magnetic anomalies, sea floor debris, 
harsh operating conditions, extraneous noise and the special equipment needed 
(Dobkowski, 2007; Sakhuja, 2005). 
Although the same conditions that make the underwater theater difficult to defend also 
impose hardships on the attackers, recent changes to defensive posture and terrorist 
training have increased the attractiveness of the underwater attack. As traditional, land-
and air-based targets become increasingly hardened against attacks, terrorists seek other 
targets with an increased probability of mission success. Whereas the underwater 
environment had a lower probability of success because of its harsh environment, it now 
has a greater probability of success than attacking a hardened target. 
Additionally, terrorists are becoming more resourceful and better trained for the marine 
environment. Abu Sayyaf, a militant Islamic separatist group based in the Philippines, is 
known to have conducted training for scuba diver strikes, and al-Nasheri claimed al-
Qa'ida could use both submersibles and "human torpedoes" (Sakhuja, 2005, np). Sri 
Lanka's Navy experienced two losses associated to underwater terrorism: In the first 
36 
instance a fast attack craft sank after experiencing a blast at 2:30 in the morning. This 
blast may be attributed to improvised mines or to divers; the Sri Lankan government has 
not released the details, but the Tamil Tigers took credit for the attack claiming that three 
of their operatives had engaged the boat (Vasan, 2008a). In the second instance, known 
to be a suicide diver, the 520 foot logistics support ship, formerly known as the 
Invincible, was attacked and sunk while moored at Ashroff Jetty, Trincomalee 
(DefenceWire, 2008; Vasan, 2008b). Authorities confirmed a suicide diver conducted 
this attack because a piece of the diver's torso and diving equipment were recovered 
(South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2008). 
A trained diver would not have to blow himself up to be successful; the use of improvised 
or stolen mines could be used to temporarily block harbors, destroy shipping or damage 
land based critical infrastructure (e.g., water intakes to nuclear reactors) in either stand 
alone attacks or as part of a choreographed attack on a harbor or coastal region 
(Hasslinger, 2008). Colombo Port was spared an attack because of bad weather and 
effective security. Eight ships had been targeted and the eight explosive packages with 
timing devices and magnets, for attaching to the packages to the hulls, were recovered 
(Fuard & Kamalendran, 2006). Although one of the attackers committed suicide with a 
cyanide capsule, four others were arrested. Their boats also had frogmen's kits, oxygen 
cylinders, mobile communication and navigation equipment and National Identity Cards 
(Fuard & Kamalendran, 2006). Given the grave consequences of a successful water-
borne attack, the increased attractiveness to adversaries for an underwater attack, and the 
demonstrated planning and preparation of adversaries, attention to terrorist threat in the 
maritime domain is vital. 
The business community has been dedicating resources to the research and development 
of devices to detect and thwart underwater terrorist attacks. The Underwater Inspection 
Systems (UIS), manufactured by the CodaOctopus group, is a real-time three-
dimensional sonar that can be used to image the underwater theater. It can be used 
proactively to first scan and develop a catalog of known objects in a port area. Then, if a 
threat is received, a second scan can be conducted and compared with the first to 
determine anomalies, which can later be investigated by response teams. If an 
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underwater catalog has not been created, the UIS can still be used to conduct an initial 
search to assist the response teams in their planning. UIS can be used for bottom 
scanning, piers and wharfs or examining the bottoms of boats, as necessary. Other 
devices, similar to the UIS but designed to detect divers, are the Underwater Surveillance 
System manufactured by Kongsberg Maritime and the Sentinel Intruder Detection Sonar 
made by Sonardyne. Three different manufacturers with viable products that have 
successfully come to market and have been purchased by governments and police units 
around the world indicate a need for underwater inspection and detection devices. 
Effective deployment of these devices is a key concept that initiated this research. 
Financial resources are limited and utilizing these tools represents a significant financial 
commitment. The U.S. Coast Guard employs several of the devices mentioned above as 
part of the Underwater Port Security System as an anti-diver tactic. The Coast Guard 
also conducts an Underwater Terrorism Preparedness Program, which develops 
actionable preparedness plans in partnership with all port agencies in a geographic area. 
The program brings responders together before an incident to outline coordination and 
control tactics, techniques and procedures that will be used at the port facility. The final 
product is the Underwater Terrorism Prevention Plan for a port area (Branham, 2009). 
Another indicator of the importance of a topic is seminars or meetings dedicated to the 
topic and non-peer reviewed articles published by practitioners of the trade. Although 
there has not been a dedicated underwater terrorism conference, many conferences have 
been held related to various topics pertinent to underwater terrorism. For example, the 
Mine Warfare Association has hosted conferences and proceedings annually dating back 
to 2001 and five of the 13 themes for this year's Undersea Defense Technology 
Conference and Symposium (Asia) are underwater terrorism related including Undersea 
Port and Harbor Security (Underwater Defense Technology, 2010). 
Within the literature, several articles have been published that discuss underwater 
terrorism. In a trade magazine for military and defense industry, Hasslinger (2008) 
describes a worst case scenario at the beginning of his article and then suggests several 
actions government planners should consider, including improving the nature and scope 
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of the United States' vulnerabilities, conducting war games and using the output of the 
games to study the variables pertinent to the underwater theatre and to assess what 
systems are required to restore services after an attack. Popular Mechanics, a general 
audience magazine with numerous departments, discussed ways in which the U.S. Navy 
may counter the threat of underwater terrorism (Pappalardo, 2009). Many user Internet 
sites with news articles (with robust comments) or blogs exist that are dedicated to the 
subject. 
Unclassified scholarly research into underwater terrorism is minimal but indicates 
academia is addressing this problem. One article, on asymmetric warfare, has two 
paragraphs that describe the underwater domain as asymmetric in nature without 
simulation capabilities (Hill, 2004). Another article is pertinent and discusses countering 
underwater terrorism through either a sensor-centric approach or a capability-based 
approach (Kessel, 2007). Both approaches mentioned by Kessel (2007) require the 
defender to respond once the attacker is already actively attacking the facility. 
Other academic material, not previously cited, ranges from the abstract, for example, 
summarizing or mapping the existing terrorism research domain (see Kushman & Rubin, 
2009; Reid & Chen, 2007) to the specific (e.g., effects on the human body of explosions 
underwater, Almogy & Rivkind, 2007). A plethora of material exists, which may be 
generalized to this research, that discusses collection of and analyzing data on terrorism 
(see Gupta, 2005; Jonas & Harper, 2006) through the modeling (see Haimes, 2002) and 
risk management (see Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jha, 2009; Liu, Chen, Gao & Jiang, 
2005) processes. One aim of this research is to reduce the gap from the existing material 
in terrorism to the specific and unique area of underwater terrorism by applying accepted 
methods in risk management and uncertainty reduction. 
2.5. Parameters 
Pertinent to the discussion of underwater terrorism, is the discussion of the variables that 
comprise the risk equation, ergo the parameters. In the intelligence community, threat is 
first decomposed into the intent (I), capability (Ca) and activity (A) of the adversary such 
that R = /[(ICaA)VC] (Bodnar, 2005; Chase, Day, Cline, & O'Hagan, 1995). Intent is 
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comprised of the adversary's ideology, the stated goals of the adversary and the 
adversary's propaganda history. Capability includes the adversary's tactics, techniques 
and procedures, operational history and the availability of key resources, specifically 
people and raw materials. Activity indicate the adversary is actively engaged in attack 
preparations and includes logistics, movement of people, pre-operational planning, 
training, pre-operational surveillance, information collection, and testing of the target. 
The intent of an adversary, analogous to purpose, is indicated by the adversary's 
ideology, goals and propaganda. Formally, an adversarial ideology is the ideas and 
manner of thinking of the adversary, as a group, which oppose the defender, the 
defender's ideology or the defender's values (Berman, 2008). Very closely related, but 
distinct from ideology is stated goals, which are the explicitly declared results desired 
that the adversary is working towards. It would be naive to consider that the stated goals 
of an adversary are truly representative of the collective. However, for the purpose of the 
overall understanding of risk, abstraction of the stated goals to the collective members of 
the adversarial organization is both suitable and appropriate (Thompson, 2006). Stated 
goals should not be confused with motivation, which is more personal in nature and tied 
to individual actors. Propaganda is the spreading of ideas and information for the 
purpose of helping the adversary's cause or to damage the defender's cause (Propaganda, 
2011). It "consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect 
the minds, emotions, and action of a given group for a specific purpose" (Linebarger, 
1954, p. 39). 
The capability indicates the adversary's ability or competency to execute an attack and 
examines past operations and the accumulation of people and material. Critical to 
assessing the adversary's capabilities is understanding the adversary's tactics, techniques 
and procedures, usually referred to by its abbreviation, TTP. TTP is comprised of three 
distinct actions that guide the operation based on the evolving knowledge and experience 
(U.S. Army, 2011): tactics are the employment of people working in relation to one 
another; techniques are non-prescriptive methods used employ a tactic and "procedures 
are the standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks" (Ibid, p. 6). 
Experts have some indication that adversarial groups either transfer information or learn 
40 
from each other concerning successful TTP (Hedges & Karasik, 2010). As with any 
organization, an adversary also learns from past successes and mistakes. An adversary's 
operational history consists of the past operations conducted by the adversary and 
provides an understanding of what influences, including cultural, social, economic and 
political forces, impact the organization. 
As in any organization, people are the key resource, which form the foundation of this 
research. Without people, from leadership to front line "soldiers", an adversary would 
not exist. Terrorist organizations use similar methods to recruit and train people 
regardless of the tactics, techniques or procedures employed in their attacks (Ozeren, 
Gunes & Al-Babayneh, 2007). It also appears that terrorist organizations operate under 
less restrictive norms of rationality (Thompson, 2006). 
Vital to any successful attack is the acquisition of materials for the operation, including 
weapons or explosives, and special equipment for operation in the unsympathetic 
underwater environment. The acquisition of key resources necessary to conduct 
operations, either through legal means (purchasing) or illegal means (stealing, black 
market) may include material necessary to conduct pre-operational requirements, for 
example, flight manuals (Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, n.d.). 
The final disaggregation of threat includes action, which is the process of performing an 
act or activity. In any attack, training must occur beforehand to indoctrinate the 
organization's people on its tactics, techniques and procedures. Training is not the formal 
training as defined from the discipline of human performance technology. Instead, 
training implies any intervention meant to teach a person a particular skill or behavior. 
Training includes providing digital manuals, circulating paper propaganda with a generic 
vision, mission and instructions to the more formal organized training camps where 
people prepare physically and mentally to accomplish tasks. To prepare for both the 
attack and any pertinent training, material must be moved to training areas or attack sites. 
Moving material is logistics, which is narrowly defined as the movement and 
maintenance of material (U.S. Army, 1985). An underwater attack requires particular 
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materials and processes to effectively deploy an attack and this specificity is discretely 
observable by the defender. 
In addition to moving material for training or operational staging, the movement of 
people must occur. Movement of people is narrowly defined as the change of physical 
location of people to accomplish tasks, including training, pre-operational surveillance or 
testing or positioning of people for the planned attack. Conceptually movement of people 
is more concerned with long distance travel (e.g., transnational flights) vice the daily 
commuting required for shopping, communications or pre-operational activities. People 
are also required for pre-operational planning, essentially the process of developing 
"tasks, in a prescribed order, that are intended to reach a desired operational end state, 
normally within a given time" (Zhang, et al., 2001, p. 3). 
The final three elements of action can be combined into a concept called probing (Gay, 
2012). Probing exists when an adversary explores the target through information 
collection, pre-operational surveillance and testing. Information collection occurs when 
an adversary attempts to gain information about a place, person or operation pertaining to 
a target, usually through inquiries including online searches (Indiana Intelligence Fusion 
Center, n.d.). Pre-operational surveillance involves an adversary observing a target to 
determine strengths, weaknesses and the number of emergency personnel that may 
respond to an incident (Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, n.d). Pre-operational 
surveillance is different from information collection because surveillance requires people 
to observe the defender directly and provides an opportunity for defenders to receive 
indicators of adversarial activity (STRATFOR, 2005). Near the final stages of pre­
operational planning, adversaries may conduct testing. Testing is the adversarial actions 
intend to activate defender response to penetration of security barriers (Indiana 
Intelligence Fusion Center, n.d.) and is useful in validating the efficacy of the operational 
plans. 
2.6. Ongoing Research 
The deficiencies in the theoretical and methodological approaches noted above are being 
addressed by academia. For example, Guikema (2012) examined the necessary 
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conditions for intelligent adversary models and partnered with Aven to parse the sources 
of uncertainty within the analysis practice (Aven & Guikema, 2011). Bristow, Fang and 
Hipel (2012) suggested utilizing systems of systems methodologies for advancing the risk 
management of extreme events, a similar concept to this research. At a more 
methodological level the exploration of game theory has been suggested as a means of 
adversarial risk analysis that includes the concepts of intelligent adversaries (Rothschild, 
McLay & Guikema, 2012). Other methods have been advanced even further including 
decision analytics (Dillion-Merrill, Parnell & Buckshaw, 2009; Parnell, Smith & Moxley, 
2010) and Bayesian reasoning (Costa, Herencia-Zapana & Laskey, 2012). The 
explorations conducted by these authors validates the gaps this research seeks to close in 





The purpose of this research is to advance the ability to manage and understand the risk 
of an underwater terrorist attack. The research contributes to the body of knowledge by 
analyzing unclassified historic data to articulate the key parameters and their 
relationships, in the threat element of the risk equation. The research also presents a 
geometric model of the risk equation which assists decision-making by facilitating an 
understanding of the relative risk of an underwater terrorist attack given two, or more, 
scenarios. 
3.2. Theoretical Framework 
Although the three phases of this research are derived from the Code of Best Practice for 
Experimentation (Albert & Hayes, 2005), the research employed many layers of 
abstraction in its design. Figure 5, the Ladder of Abstraction, illustrates those layers 
graphically. The ladder proceeds from the researcher's worldview, located at the top of 
the ladder, steadily downward to the conceptual and operational definitions for this 
research. The following sections articulate the ladder of abstraction. 
3.2.1. Researcher's Worldview 
The theoretical assumptions of a researcher's ontology and epistemology directly impact 
the methodology selected by that researcher. The methodology is the mechanism that 
enables a researcher to develop an understanding of reality. Evolving from the epistemic 
basis of realism, the research investigates qualitative data by examining the causative 
factors and variables in the identification of an adversarial threat to underwater critical 
infrastructure. Furthermore, those causative factors and variables will be used to develop 
a model to evolutionarily test hypotheses on the creation of a polyhedron risk model in 
the underwater domain. 
Krauss efficiently summarizes Lofland and Lofland's (2005) definition of meaning as the 
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linguistic categories that make up a participant's view of reality and with 
which actions are defined. Meanings are also referred to by social 
analysts as culture, norms, understandings, social reality, and definitions 
of the situation, typifications, ideology, beliefs, worldview, perspective or 
stereotypes, (p. 762) 
Researcher's beliefs & assumption: my worldview 
Framework, theories & concepts used to articulate the problem, 
purpose & structure for the research 
Empirical - what can be observed: the variables 
Conceptual and operational definitions 
Figure 5: Ladder of abstraction 
Given that Western culture and society is fundamentally different from the norms of the 
perceived adversaries, applying Western contexts and understanding of reality to those of 
the adversary may provide inaccurate definitions, interpretations or justifications for the 
adversary's behavior. The researcher is known to be handicapped by the perception 
barrier and may have unknowingly introduced bias in understanding an adversary's 
intentions and capabilities. 
3.2.1.1. Ontology 
Ontology, essentially the philosophy of reality, is the understanding of entities, 
relationships and interactions at the highest levels of physics and society. The 
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understanding of the nature of all things is based on either individual or collective 
conceptualizations - essentially formulating explanations for observed phenomena. The 
conceptualizations are based on perspective and social influences (e.g., the Galilean 
argument of the center of the solar system - as being Sun or Earth centric was based on 
teachings up to that point and challenged by the new information). A researcher's 
ontological assumptions will influence the choice of methods employed and the resulting 
conclusions. 
The researcher's ontology is generally positivistic - truth is independent of the 
researcher. However, reality, when considering the nature of the research subject, 
adversary's intent on doing harm, should be conceptualized as the ultimate goal, not the 
immediate actions or intentions of the adversary. The researcher suggests this research, 
even if discovered by the subjects, will not change the nature of reality on the immediate 
articulation of reality and this truth was discovered empirically by applying both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
3.2.1.2. Epistemology 
Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge, an understanding of how we come to 
know and the relationship between the knower and the known (Krauss, 2005). A 
researcher's epistemology is the foundation for how the researcher develops knowledge 
about his/her ontology, in essence, the basis of the researcher's reality. 
The researcher's paradigm is more centered on the epistemic continuum - one of realism, 
which contains elements of both positivism and constructivism (Healy & Perry, 2000). 
The researcher believes, and approached this research with this conceptualization: that 
there exist multiple perceptions about a single, mind-independent reality (Healy & Perry, 
2000). The researcher believes there are differences between the actual reality and 
peoples' (whether individual or collective) perceptions of reality. By using empirical 
methods the researcher endeavored to foster knowledge utilizing a variety of "theoretical 
reasoning and experimentation" (Outhwaite, 1983, p. 332). 
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3.2.2. Framework, theories and concepts 
This research draws from a diverse foundation for theories and concepts including 
organizational, systems, risk, and uncertainty theory. Furthermore, the research is based 
on the language and functions inherent in set theory, graph theory and geometry. 
In studying the behavior of the complex adversarial organization, the doctrine of 
organizational theory was employed. Organizational theory provided a multidisciplinary 
and systems based strategy to research both the parameters and relations at a macro-level. 
Applying principles from anthropology, the organizational culture was dissected into 
quantitative parameters and further studied. Organizational theory provided a plethora of 
methods including multiple regression, non-parametric statistics, meta-analysis and 
ANOVA. It also provided philosophy on the study of the rationality of an adversarial 
organization and its structure, control and technology. It also permitted a systems 
framework to be applied to interpret the complex dynamic goal-oriented processes 
demonstrated by the adversarial organizations. 
Paramount to this research was application of the tenets of systems theory. Systems 
thinking provided a framework and techniques to reduce the adversarial organization 
holistically. The relationship between the adversary and the defender was built upon the 
concepts of the system-environment boundary, input, output, process, state, information 
and goal-directedness. The philosophy of the research was based on the whole system 
concept - essentially that a defender cannot exist in the defending state without the 
existence of an adversary and that one's actions directly impacts the other, even if 
knowledge of the action is non-existent. The research also leveraged equifinality across 
the geometric model to offset the areas of the model with increased uncertainty. 
Both Risk and Uncertainty theory provided significant influences in the approach and 
development of the mathematical model. Applied Risk theory has traditionally been 
focused on decision-making under probabilistic uncertainty and was influential in 
approaching the analysis of the parameters and relations. The Risk Index, the Risk 
Measure, the Uncertainty Measure and the Loss Function inspired the mathematical 
concepts for the model, providing both the approach and the structure. Additionally, the 
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malice spectrum for quantifying the parameters is derived from the maximum uncertainty 
principle. 
In both the approach and the implementation of the parametric research, set theory 
provided language and arithmetic functions. The model's mathematical basis is derived 
from applying set theory to the parameters and relations described as objects. 
Maturing the relationship between the objects collected within the sets, graph theory 
provided the language and a theoretical background for the development of the 
mathematical structure used to model the relations between the parameters. Graph theory 
also provided the theoretical foundation for the development of the matrix, which 
executes construction of the network diagram, forming the structure of the geometric 
model. 
Finally, geometry provided the language and theoretical basis for the instantiation of the 
polyhedral model, including the location of the nodes as coordinates and the 
determination of the volume and the surface area. 
3.2.3. Empirical basis 
The empirical basis for this research is derived from experimentation that tests the 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between the parameters observed in samples and 
the relative risk between the samples. The original data obtained through observation of 
the samples include (1) if a parameter is observable within a sample and (2) the evaluated 
magnitude of the parameter in the sample. The data obtained through experimentation 
are the output of the experiment, a dimensionless value representing a geometric value 
relative to the specific sample. 
Using the definition provided in Section 0, the parameters are both enumerable and 
capable of being used in mathematical statements, ergo axiomatizable. 
Several constraints on empirical purity were noted including the ability to observe the 
parameters directly and the bias in determining vulnerability and consequence introduced 
by the data deriving from Western, academic viewpoints as opposed to an adversarial 
origin. The first constraint was minimized by using trusted sources of data and more than 
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one source for each sample. The use of multiple data sources and trusted databases 
elevated the expectation of data integrity by relying on other trained observers following 
documented procedures and independently verifying those observations. The second 
constraint, bias, is noted and accepted because the focus of the research is on the threat 
element and not the vulnerability and consequence. 
3.2.4. Definitions 
Different nuances in the definitions of terms used across the risk and intelligence 
domains exist. The definitions were taken from multiple sources, aggregated and then 
simplified for clarity. Table 1 provides the term, the variable used and the applicable 
definition. 
Table 1: Operational definitions 
Concept Variable Operational definition 
Risk R R = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence 
Threat T T = Intent * Capability * Activity 
Intent I I = Propaganda * Stated Intention * Adversarial ideology 
Capability C 
C = Tactics, techniques & procedure * Operational 
history * key resources (people) * key resources 
(material) 
Activity A 
A = Logistics * Movement of people * Surveillance * 
Information collection * Testing 
Propaganda P 
Propagating ideas and/or information for the purpose of 




i The beliefs that guide a group in opposition to the 
Defender's ideology or values 
Stated goals g The explicitly declared results desired that the adversary 




An adversary's attempts to gain information about a 
target during the pre-operational planning stage. 
Table 1. (Continued) 
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Concept Variable Operational definition 
Consequence c 
The total subjective value of damage inflicted as the 




The people directly involved in conducting the attack, 





The process of developing plans to achieve an operational 
goal. 
Operational 




People working together in non-prescriptive methods or 
by following common methodologies. 
Preoperational 
surveillance 
s Observing a target to determine strengths, weaknesses and forces available. 
Key resources -
material 
m The acquisition of supplies necessary to conduct 
operations. 
Logistics 1 The movement of material. 
Movement of 
people 
b The change of physical location of people to accomplish 
tasks. 
Training r 
Any intervention meant to teach a person a particular skill 
or behavior related to adversarial conduct. 
Unique 
environment 
u The setting or conditions in which the attack will be 
conducted in or access to the Defender through. 
Testing e Adversarial actions intend to provoke an observable 
response to an aggressive stimulus. 
Vulnerability v 
"The set of critical infrastructure-specific opportunities 
available for an adversary to exploit in conducting 
operations, including reconnaissance and operational 
attacks" (Gay & Hester, 2010, np). 
3.3. Rationale for method 
This research methodology was chosen because of the degree of the problem formulation, 
the data available, the environment of the study (to wit, manipulation of the variables ex 
post facto), the methods accepted by the engineering community, and the quantification 
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of the data for sharing across diverse communities. The problem was strongly defined by 
inputs (expected parameters), their characteristics and range of conditions and the output 
(measure of relative risk and an understanding of what influences the value). The data 
were available in publicly available databases, government sites and open media. The 
experimentation method is accepted by the engineering community, and using the Code 
of Best Practice as a guide, enhanced the integrity of the process. Quantification was 
vital for analyzing the correlation of the parameters and for describing the magnitude of 
the parameters during the experiment phase. Quantification also supported positivism, 
which stresses an objective approach based on quantitative analysis and experiments. 
Cohen, Lawrence and Morrison (2000) observed that there are four assumptions of 
science: determinism, empiricism, parsimony and generality. This research, deterministic 
in origin, researched the casual links for understanding the events driven by factors. In 
collecting empirical evidence to support a hypothesis, and by robustly validating the 
model, both empiricism and parsimony were upheld and facilitated generality. 
An examination of the precepts of naturalism, qualitative in nature, indicated that it was 
not well suited as a methodology for this research. Naturalistic research is subjective and 
traditionally employs case studies and interviews as methodologies, neither of which 
appear practical for this research. Pure case studies usually produce more detailed 
information than statistical analysis but are often considered less credible and can be 
biased by the researcher's intimate knowledge of the case (Hill, 1993; Lueck & Spurlock, 
2003). Case studies are also difficult to generalize because they are based on qualitative 
data that is generalizable to only a particular context (Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Yin, 
1994). Another concern is the sensitive nature of any case study - in many instances the 
case study would be classified and become unusable for this research. The second 
option, conducting interviews, is not feasible and would be of dubious value since the 
interview could prejudice the legal proceedings of the interviewed, creating doubt to the 
integrity of the interview. Given the constraints enumerated and the nature of the 
problem, model-based experimentation was indicated. 
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3.4. Research design 
The research design followed a traditional waterfall input-process-output model of 
hypothesis testing. Figure 6 illustrates elements of the research design including the 
primary inputs and outputs for the research design, which are explained in the following 
sections. 
3.4.1. Input 
The research design was impacted by six key inputs, outlined below. The inputs had 
minimal variability but significant influence on the research design and were outside of 






















Figure 6: Research design 
3.4.1.1. Open sources 
Data were acquired utilizing publically available information including government, 
academic, and news media sources. Open source information provides a basis for 
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understanding the minimal data available from the government or academic terrorism 
databases. The information contained in open sources must be viewed in context and 
examined for the source of the information when seeking collaboration. Three, four or 
even more similar versions of the same fact may be propagated by one news company 
and modified by local authors - indicating no collaboration of fact. The open source 
news media provided an archive of analog material that was not available digitally, 
except as a photograph or scanned image. 
3.4.1.2. Intelligence Community's methodologies 
The perspective of both the researcher and the literature reviewed has been forged from a 
defensive viewpoint, which has been influenced by the methodologies employed by the 
intelligence community, which provided the initial categorization of data and heavily 
influenced the reliability of those data. 
3.4.1.3. Terrorism Databases 
The primary data for this research were obtained from unclassified governmental and 
academic databases. Each database was selected for academic excellence and robustness. 
However, the databases were representative of the defender perspective and limited in 
scope by the designer of the database. The databases available did not contain 
standardized parameters or entries, requiring extensive cross-referencing and additional 
data derived from open sources. 
3.4.1.4. Databases used 
Three databases were used for the primary search for data. The databases were 
administered by either government or educational institutions that are Centers of 
Excellence for terrorism research. The databases, shown in Table 2, did not include the 
requisite data to conduct a robust analysis of the parameters but represent the initial 
source of information that provided the foundation of this research. 
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Table 2: Databases used in this research 
Database Name Parent Organization Comments 




A compilation of terrorism 
data from 1972 through 2009 
Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) 
The National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism 
(START) located at the 
University of Maryland 
An open-source database 
including information on 
terrorist events around the 
world from 1970 through 
2010 
Worldwide Incidents 
Tracking Systems (WITS) 
National Counter Terrorism 
Center (NCTC) 
The U.S. Government's 
database on acts of terrorism 
compiled from open source 
data from 2005 to 2010. 
3.4.1.5. Mathematical laws and theories 
Mathematical laws and theories provided influence by introducing some of the language 
and theories for this research. 
3.4.1.6. Canon of science 
The Canon of Science provided a standardized basis for comparison of all research on a 
common ground through four criterions, commonly identified as Truth Value, 
Applicability, Consistency, and Neutrality. Truth Value, or internal validity, is a tenet of 
research design that includes such aspects as study rigor (the method used, care in 
measurement and understanding of what wasn't measured) and considering what possible 
alternative explanations may exist for the causal relationships observed (Huitt, 1998). 
Applicability, also called external validity or generalizability, ensures the research can be 
used more broadly and adds value to the research process. Consistency, sometimes 
called reliability or replicability, allows for other researchers to validate or verify the 
findings of the research both as a means of confirming the findings and as a basis for 
advancing future research. The final criterion, Neutrality, focuses on the objectivity of 
the research. Together, the Canon provides a framework upon which research the 
research will be advanced. 
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3.4.2. Research phases 
Using the COBPE (Alberts & Hayes, 2005) as a guide, the research was parsed into three 
phases: pre-experiment, experiment and post-experiment, which are shown in Figure 7. 
During the pre-experiment phase the first three research questions were explored in detail 
and the conceptual model, a mathematical construct, was developed. Data were obtained 
from numerous sources, as noted in Section 0, and a multivariate analysis was conducted 
to determine the relationships between the parameters. 
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Figure 7: Research phases 
Using the information obtained from the analysis and the mathematical model, a network 
diagram was constructed to examine the model in a multi-perspective approach. The 
network diagram facilitated examining the nature of the model (verification of the nature 
of the relationships, open or closed construct, number of surfaces, etc.) prior to 
construction of the executable model. Finally, the executable model was constructed and 
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tested. At this point, the fourth research question, what is the measure of risk, remained 
unanswered. Upon completion of the testing of the executable model, per Section 3.5.5, 
the pre-experiment phase was completed. 
Testing of the executable model found it to be valid, allowing testing of the null 
hypothesis to commence. Using the same samples from the pre-experiment phase, the 
research entered the second phase, the experimentation phase. During the 
experimentation phase, the values of each sample's parameters were run through the 
model to determine the relative risk across the sample space. The first sample, n=26, 
called Sample A, included output of both the surface area of the geometric shape and the 
sum of the edges which comprise the geometric shape. The results from Sample A 
demonstrated that calculating the surface area was contraindicated, therefore the second 
sample, n=25, only had output for the sum of the edges of the geometric shape. 
In the third phase, post experiment, an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
sampling process, the impact of the hypothesis testing, and improvements to the 
modeling process were completed. Details of this phase can be found in Section 3.7. 
The results of the analysis from Sample A were used to improve the methodology for 
Sample B. 
External validity was facilitated by using the intelligence community's variables as a 
basis and by conducting a robust analysis of the causal effects to derive the relationships. 
Given the researcher's prior experience in this area, care was taken to validate both the 
existence, and the value, of the parameter to mitigate the effects of the Rosenthal effect 
(Rosenthal, 2002). To corroborate the parameters deduced from the analysis of the 
samples, expert opinion was solicited from a group of risk and intelligence professionals. 
To further generalization, mitigation of the situation—specific parameter "underwater 
environment" was not used. Instead, the parameter "unique environment" was 
substituted. However, given that only cases of underwater terrorism were drawn as 
samples, the constrained data sample remains a potential barrier to external validity. 
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3.5. Process 
The actual experiment, although guided by the empirical process of hypothesis testing, 
was an adaptive experiment intended to build and validate a model that facilitates 
managing and understanding of the epistemic risk of an underwater attack. Although 
described in serial fashion, the design evoked a reiterative nature, as shown in Figure 8, 
which is based on the principles for conducting a model-based experiment from the 
COBPE (Alberts & Hayes, 2005). Readers familiar with the COBPE should note that the 
COBPE exists to support experimentation that answers questions about another area 
under research whereas with this research, the area under research is the focus of the 
experimental design. 











model Prior research 
& modeling Available 
data 
Figure 8: Research process 
3.5.1. Phase 1: Pre-experiment 
The pre-experiment phase focused on data collection and creation of the Human-in-the 
loop model. The Data Collection Plan, Appendix A, documented the process used to 
collect, protect and archive samples collected. A literature review was conducted to 
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determine the appropriate process to quantify the qualitative data, as noted in Section 0. 
Section 0 explains the data collection in more detail. Following data collection, a 
multivariate analysis was conducted and critically reviewed. A detailed discussion of the 
analysis process is described in Section 0. The results of the analysis were used to create 
the conceptual model. The conceptual model, mathematical in nature, facilitated 
understanding of the quantitative parameters involved, the nature of the experiment, and 
potential barriers to model validity. 
The conceptual model and network graph enabled development and testing of the human-
in-the-loop (HIL) model. The HIL model demonstrated the interactions and limits of the 
executable model and assisted in the testing design, Section 3.5.5. The HIL model 
evolved into the executable model and provided rapid analysis of functionality that 
influenced the hypothesis testing and anomaly-handling precepts. The completion of the 
executable model's validation and verification testing marked the transition to the 
experiment phase. 
3.5.1.1. Quantifying qualitative variables 
Since there exist numerous methods to quantify qualitative data (e.g., Chi, 1997; Darby, 
2004; Dey, 1993; Shemmings, 2006) a literature review was conducted to determine the 
most appropriate method which could be easily applied to the epistemic uncertainty 
inherent in underwater terrorism. The literature review included products from the 
National Intelligence Community (see publications from the Central Intelligence 
Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence) and academic research pertaining to 
information in the news media (e.g. Dunn, Moore & Nosek, 2005). 
3.5.1.2. Data collection 
The research employed a deductive empirical cycle initially examining parameters from 
previous research for a maritime risk analysis tool (Gay, 2006). Entering the databases 
noted in Section 0, a keyword search was performed using the words listed in Table 3. A 
review of the results of the key word search was conducted and relevant entries were 
extracted and created the basis of the sample's population. An example of the data 
collection log worksheet is given in Appendix B. Using the initial data set drawn from 
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the databases, additional research was conducted with open source material (law 
enforcement briefs, scholarly journals and open source media) to continue to develop the 
attack's profile. Profiles of each scenario were examined utilizing multiple perspectives, 
including the intelligence community's threat analysis, organizational theory 
prepositions, precepts of cyber terrorism studies and dive planning. 
Table 3: Keywords used in database search 
Underwater Undersea Submerged Submarine Marine 
Maritime Aquatic Diver Limpet UWIED 
Although there were many sources of information, a case was only accepted if it had at 
least two trusted (defined as government or academic center of excellence) references. 
No classified material was reviewed. However, open source (media or educational 
institution) material was used to better understand the total scenario. 
As the sample's profile was developed, data were examined for originality, fact, and 
supposition and then compared against known organizations. For example, the profiles 
of various terrorist groups are well documented and openly available (e.g., LTTE). This 
information augmented the sample's profile, providing background for the sample where 
the original sources may have omitted details. As data were examined, each sample's 
data tested the null hypothesis - that the parameters indicated encompassed the domain of 
knowledge about a particular sample. 
Each sample was also specifically researched through the databases after the initial key 
word search. As the samples were examined, the databases indicated additional cross-
references that were pursued as separate data points. The samples were cross-referenced 
to ensure each sample indicated one, and only one, separate incident. 
The output of the data collection was two matrices. The first matrix, called the Binary 
matrix, was composed of the indicator variables, utilizing the number one to indicate the 
parameters were noted in the specific case, or a zero, representing no indication of the 
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parameter was observed. The second matrix, called the Malice matrix, was composed on 
the value, determined by using the Malice Spectrum, for each parameter in the model. 
The Malice Spectrum presented in detail in Section 4.2, maps representative qualitative 
judgments to quantitative values. Where the specific case provided no indication of the 
value of the parameters, the value 0.5 (absolute uncertainty) was entered. 
As a means to determine the importance and the ease of collecting the parameters used in 
this research, expert opinion was solicited based on a survey-like tool. The instrument 
was sent via email to a select group of known experts with a list of 21 parameters. Each 
expert was asked to evaluate the 21 parameters for importance in determining the overall 
risk and for ease in obtaining the value of the parameter. A Likert scale of one to five 
was employed. For importance, five represented critically important. For ease, five 
represented very difficult to obtain. 
Four experts were selected to represent a cross section of maritime intelligence and 
critical infrastructure risk analysis. The experts came from academia, the Department of 
Homeland Security and from the Coast Guard's intelligence community. In addition to 
asking the experts to evaluate the parameters, each expert was asked for his/her 
experience in the field and formal training or education in the discipline. An expert was 
defined utilizing two criteria - education in the domain and experience. The minimum 
requirement for education was at least 160 hours of classroom instruction, or 20 
classroom days, which is comparable to 10 credit hours of study. This criterion ensured a 
basis for understanding of the vocabulary and methodologies available. The second 
criterion, experience, was based on the emergent property of communities of practice. 
The criteria of having accomplished at least 10,000 hours of practical experience within 
the domain (Gladwell, 2008) equates to about five years of full time employment in the 
domain. The domains were homeland security risk and homeland security threat 
analysis. The results of the solicitation were plotted on a scatter plot based on the 
average value of the opinions provided. 
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3.5.1.3. Dummy variable definitions 
In soliciting the expert opinion, seventeen of the parameters on the instrument were the 
ones used in this research. The other four parameters, called dummy parameters, were 
inserted as a control and to determine their value in the overall risk picture. The four 
dummy parameters were selected because they are currently used in intelligence or risk 
studies. Two parameters, population index and criticality are considered part of the 
consequence element. Leadership was selected as a distracter since the leaders of an 
organization are always important, but in the current distributed leadership model 
employed by adversarial groups it may not be known. The final dummy parameter, 
finance, is obviously vital to conducting any activity but does not directly relate to the 
threat element. Finance relates to threat because it supports acquiring material, moving 
people and material and enabling training. The specific definitions, as provided to the 
experts are articulated below. 
Leadership (a) is the "process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid 
and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task" (Chemers, 1997, p. 1) 
through overall direction and strategy. Depending on the structure and primary influence 
to the adversarial group, leadership may be a person or a group of people who guide or 
direct the adversarial organization. Leadership can be viewed as the organizational 
construct of command and control or the personalities of the leaders actually in specific 
roles. 
Finance (d) is the activity that includes the origination, marketing, and management of 
cash and money surrogates through a variety of fund raising, capital accounts, and 
investments created for supporting and entertaining the adversarial organization or to pay 
for protection and asylum. 
Directly linked to consequence, but frequently considered separately, is the population 
index (x) of an area. Essentially, it is a measure of all of the people inhabiting a specified 
area, including transients (e.g. commuters versus resident). Population index is 
occasionally measured as density, ergo, the number of people living per unit of an area 
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(e.g. per square mile) or the number of people relative to the space occupied by those 
people. 
One parameter, which has been treated as part of consequence or as an independent 
variable, is criticality (y). Criticality accounts for the severity of the consequences for the 
entity. Criticality is directly related to the importance of the facility to a system and its 
environment when considering a specific event and the impact of the loss of that facility. 
3.5.2. Sample analysis 
Utilizing the Binary matrix a multivariate analysis was conducted. The samples were 
drawn from numerous databases and augmented by open source documents; thus the 
variables were discrete random variables demonstrating a range of possible, but 
countable, values, ergo a discrete random variable. This characteristic is attributed to the 
origin of the samples, primarily the trusted databases and open source documents 
generated by numerous authors for varying purposes. Utilizing the Binary matrix, two 
analyses were conducted, covariance and correlation of coefficient, to evaluate the latent 
structure contained within the set of variables from the sample. The covariance provided 
the behavior between the parameters - whether similar or dissimilar. The correlation 
coefficient provided the linear dependence. These analysis were run on both Sample A, 
n=26, and Sample B, n=25, independently. The threshold ranges accepted for the 
Pearson's correlation was -1.0 to -0.5 and 0.5 to 1.0. 
The results of the multivariate analysis were compared with the results of the critical 
analysis and where there were differences, further analysis occurred. The additional 
analysis included further research on the parameters of the sample and questioning the 
validity of the parameters indicated in the initial sample. The additional research was 
focused on questioning the efficacy of the process used to evaluate the sample, not on 
adjusting the process to sample to the expected results. 
3.5.3. Network graph 
The network graph was generated using MATLAB© software. A 17 X 17 matrix was 
created using ones to indicate where relationships exist, as indicated by of correlation 
coefficient. Utilizing the biograph function a network graph was created, and visually 
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analyzed. This analysis consisted of comparing the displayed nodes and edges with the 
17 X 17 matrix to ensure equivalence and then comparing the network to the output 
matrix of the multivariate analysis. Although the analysis of the table of parameters 
indicated the existence of super-nodes (nodes connected to every other node), the 
network graph indicated concerns with using volume or surface area of the resulting 
geometric shapes - that the geometric shapes would be pulled apart by dissimilar values 
of the edges. This concern was instrumental in creation of the error handling for the 
Human-in-the-Loop and executable models. The length of the edges in the network were 
determined by the MATLAB© biograph function and do not represent any particular 
value. They exist only to visually indicate relationships. 
3.5.4. Human-in-the-Loop (HIL) model 
The HIL model was created in MATLAB© using the conceptual model produced from 
the relationships noted in the correlation of coefficients and network graph and using 
Heron's formula to determine the surface area of the triangles by using the value of the 
edges. Heron's formula first determines the semi-perimeter, sp, using: 
(a + b + c) 
sp = 
2 
where: a = length of edge xi 
b = length of edge X2 
c = length of edge X3 
and then computes the surface area of the triangle using the formula: 
Surface Area = "V sp(sp - a)(sp - b)(s/? - c) 
For Sample A, the edge lengths were computed by adding the value of the two end nodes 
for each edge of the side of every triangle in the geometric shape. Because a side of one 
triangle may also be the side of another triangle, a strong potential for duplicate values 
being included in the computation exists. Additional code was added to the model to 
compute only the edge lengths of the network diagram by summing the value of the 
nodes for each edge across the network diagram. 
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In testing Sample A's algorithm 48.6% of the test cases returned errors, shown in Figure 
15 and Figure 16. Hypothesis testing for Sample A indicated 14% of the actual cases 
evoked errors, as noted in Section 0. Therefore the process for Sample B only included 
examining the sum of the edge lengths across the network by adding the value of the two 
applicable nodes for each edge. 
The sum of the individual surface area and the sum of the edge lengths, across the 
network diagram were used as the final result of the model for Sample A. Code was 
inserted to monitor when the triangle was incalculable because either it was opened by 
stretching or so compressed that it had no surface area. In this instance, the value of zero 
was returned to the summating equation and the error was counted. The error code was 
used as numerable indicator to flag those instances where the value of the parameters 
stressed the relationships inherent in the model. It provided an opportunity to visually 
examine potential cause and effect relationships. The sum of the edge lengths across the 
network diagram was used as the final result of the model for Sample B. 
Testing of the HIL model was conducted per Section 3.5.5. Initial testing indicated that 
calculations for surface area had an unacceptable number of errors. Given this concern, 
the function for computing the volume of a polyhedron was not computed. The 
complexity of the solution space prohibited a test of the entire solution space by 
increasing the value of each parameter from zero for increments of 0.05. The estimated 
time to determine the surface area solution space, using the computing resources 
available, exceeded one century. 
3.5.5. Testing 
The test plan, based on a white-box, waterfall philosophy, was developed to test all of the 
functional, application performance and use requirements for academic testing of the 
hypothesis(s) supporting this research. Specific error handling was minimally 
incorporated in the MATLAB© code and testing was not focused on user friendliness. 
Testing of the MATLAB© environment was considered outside the scope of the test plan. 
The primary purpose of the test plan was to ensure the application met the requirements 
for supporting the determination if a relationship exists between the parameters of the 
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risk equation and the geometric properties of the instantiation of the risk equation. The 
application was not designed to be a simulation, but instead, to assist in understanding 
and managing the risk of an underwater terrorism event. The secondary purpose of the 
testing was to identify and expose all issues and associated risks with the hypothesis 
evaluation, and to ensure they are appropriately resolved. Performance was not 
considered in the testing methodology. The requirements are given in Table 4, the 
requirements traceability matrix. 
Table 4: Requirements traceability matrix 
Requirement Function Test case 
1.0 




Submit matrix to create 











Given a matrix of values that correspond to a 
pre-coded polyhedron, determine the surface 
area of all faces. 
Heron's 
formula 
Test using vectors: 
0, 0,0 
0 ,x, 0 
0, 0, x 
x, 0, x 
X, X, X 
Determine surface area 
with x equal to .5 each 
and 1.0 each. Then 
test: 
1, .7 .7 
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Table 4: (Continued) 
Requirement Function Test case 
3.0 
Given a matrix of values that correspond to a 
pre-coded polyhedron, determine the sum of 
the edge lengths. 
Sum of the 
relations 
Test using vectors: 
0, 0,0 
0 ,x, 0 
0, 0, x 
x, 0, x 
x, x, x 
Determine surface area 
with x equal to .5 each 
and 1.0 each. Then 
test: 
1, .7 .7 
4.0 
Determine the values for 2.0 and 3.0 above for 
the following cases: 
All values set at the state of complete 
uncertainty. 
All parameters = 0.5 
All values set at the state of complete 
favorability to the defender. 
All parameters = 0.0 
All values set at the state of complete 
favorability to the adversary 
All parameters = 1.0 
Values of key parameters set high and low High parameters = 1.0. 
Low parameters = 0.1 
Other parameters = 0.5 
3.5.6. Executable model 
The executable model did not differ from the human-in-the-loop model substantially. 
The only difference was how data were provided to the functions. In the human-in-the-
loop model, data were provided by a human and checked against the expected results 
after each scenario. In the executable model data were submitted to the functions via a 
script file. 
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3.6. Phase 2: Experiment 
Upon successful completion of the model's functional testing, script files were created 
from the samples, which called the model's functions and returned both graphic and 
numeric results. For Sample A, the results included data on the surface area and the sum 
of the edges. After the post experiment analysis of Sample A, it was verified that the 
surface area calculations contained too many errors. Therefore, the model was modified 
for Sample B's experiment to return only data on the sum of the edges of the network. 
After the modification the experiment continued the testing of the null hypothesis to wit, 
that it is not possible to develop a model that facilitates understanding the risk scenario 
based on the parameters observed from prior underwater terrorism incidents. 
3.7. Phase 3: Post-experiment 
The third phase of the research was the post-experiment phase, which analyzed the output 
of the model and identified revisions to the process and functionality. The analysis phase 
consisted of evaluating the network diagram, the overall range of possible values, the 
range of returned values, the standard deviation of the sampled values, and the 
proportionality of the returned results. The expectation was that an improved 
understanding of the nature of the relative risk among the samples would be evident. The 
analysis also sought to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the sampling process, the 
hypothesis testing, the model and any potential study bias to determine potential 




The research findings start with items common to all the samples - the basis of the 
parameter research and how to quantify qualitative variables. The section then progress 
through Sample A and Sample B presenting the findings on the parameters, the 
relationships between the parameters, test data for the model, the output from the 
experiment and a brief analysis of the experiments data. Discussions of the impacts of 
the analysis are included in Section 0. 
4.1. Expert opinion of parameters 
The expert opinion solicitation conducted to evaluate the efficacy of the analytical 
research conducted with Samples A and B are shown in Figure 9. The four experts 
collectively represent 31 years of experience with a minimum experience base of 6 years 
and an average of 7.75 years. For education, the respondents had an average of 1.4 years 
of education with a maximum of 3.0 years and a minimum of 230.4 hours of classroom 
time. 
Figure 9 shows the importance on the Y-axis and Ease on the x-axis. For importance, a 
five represents that the parameter is considered very important in determining risk or 
threat while a value of one represent the parameter is not very important in determining 
risk or threat. For ease, five represents the value of the parameter is very difficult to 
obtain while one represents the value of the parameter is very easy to obtain. The 
parameter key resource—people (k) and the dummy parameter finance (d) were indicated 
as most important but difficult to obtain while the parameter unique environment (u) and 
the dummy parameter population index (x) were indicated as least important although the 
population index was noted as easily obtainable. All of the parameters derived from 
answering Research Question One were rated at least a 2.5 on the 5.0 Likert scale 
validating that the parameters utilized in the research have importance within the domains 
of homeland security risk and homeland security threat analysis. 
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4.2. How to quantify qualitative variables 
In answering Research Questions One and Two the parameter was both indicated and 
related to another, or it was not. The research questions did not address the magnitude or 
Expert solkftation or paramters 
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Figure 9: Expert opinion of parameter importance and ease 
value of the parameters. The concern is how to assign a quantitative value from a 
qualitative estimate that may range across extreme values. Darby (2004) provided a basis 
for the approach to solving this problem by using possibility theory, including a 
discussion on fuzzy measures, which can range in value from 0 to 1.0. Willet (1901), in 
discussing uncertainty as a probability, asserted that uncertainty is greatest when the 
degree of probability for risk is equal to one half, or expressed as a decimal = 0.5. 
Essentially, if there is absolutely no information about a given parameter either for or 
against and adversarial position, the parameter is in its greatest state of uncertainty or 
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valued at 0.5. If, however, information about the parameter indicates an absolute end 
state, then the value is equal to 1.0, representing a 100 probability of occurrence, or 0.0, 
representing no probability of occurrence. 
However, as noted in the introduction, probability is not an acceptable means for 
quantifying the qualitative data in many instances. Since each parameter is analyzed 
under varying degrees of epistemic uncertainty and can range across a continuum of 
uncertainty (from known to completely unknown) a spectrum is appropriate. Spectrums 
are used in many domains (e.g., light, electromagnetic) and unify the end states. 
Consider that each parameter is comprised of a large number of characteristics that are n-
dimensional. Algebraic theory has two theories to address the representation of an n-
dimensional object. In linear algebra, the spectral theorem for symmetric matrices allows 
for diagonalization of a matrix that meets certain conditions. In algebraic topology, the 
generalized cohomology theory facilitates studying the topology based upon its group 
including n-dimensional closed cells. Both of these theories support using a spectrum as 
a means to mathematically instantiate a parameter from a vector or matrix of 
characteristics but do not provide a methodology to map the qualitative value to a 
quantitative result. 
The intelligence community, drawing upon research on words of estimative probability 
(see Kent, 1964, Kesselman, 2008, or Wheaton & Chido, 2008), uses the Estimative 
language continuum, Figure 10, to map the qualitative judgments of their analysts to a 
continuum. It avoids precise numerical ratings but reflects the intelligence community's 
estimate of probability (National Intelligence Estimate, 2007). 
Remote Very Unlikely Even Probably/ Very Almost 
unlikely chance Likely likely certainty 
Figure 10: Estimative language continuum 
(from National Intelligence Estimate, 2007) 
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Applying Darby's (2004) application of fuzzy measures to Willet's (1901) description of 
uncertainty yields a scale from zero to one that can then be placed over the Intelligence 
community's estimative language continuum. With minor modification of the words on 
the continuum, to encompass the vocabulary of uncertainty, a new spectrum, the Malice 
Spectrum, is created. The Malice Spectrum, shown in Figure 11, allows analysts or 
facility managers to map representative qualitative judgments to quantitative values. 
Using the perspective of the defender, information from any source, permits the analyst 
or facilities manager to develop a comparable estimate across diverse qualitative fields. 
Almost Almost 
certainty Likely Unlikely Unknown Unlikely Likely certainty 
0.0 0.25 mi 
Favorable to the Defender Unfavorable to the Defender 
Figure 11: Malice spectrum 
The Malice Spectrum permits descriptive precision in evaluating parameters while 
limiting the value of the parameters from the range zero to one, inclusive. 
4.3. Sample A 
In conducting this research, 51 cases were selected based on the integrity of the sources 
and the availability of multiple data sources as discussed in Sections 0 and 0. The cases 
were randomly mixed and the first sample, called Sample A was drawn, consisting of 26 
cases. 
4.3.1. Parameters 
Observing the first sample, Figure 12 graphically shows the descending progression of 
percentage that each parameter was observed. Recall, the parameters were treated as 
indicator random variables; therefore the mean represents the percentage that each 
parameter was observed across the sample. Additionally, as indicator random variables, 
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Figure 12: Each parameter's occurrence in Sample A by percent 
The first 11 parameters, consequence © through propaganda (p) are evident at least 80% 
of the time. The parameters consequence ©, operational planning (n), unique 
environment (u) and vulnerability (v) were observed 100% of the time. Parameter 
operational history (o) is also strong, being observed 56% of the time. Although 
parameters surveillance (s), movement of people (b), logistics (1), testing (e) and 
information collection (f) are not significantly evident, parameters surveillance (s), 
testing (e) and information collection (f) could be grouped together as probing. 
Parameters movement of people (b) and logistics (1) were not directly observed or 
reported significantly, with 8% observance for each. 
4.3.2. Relationships 
The results of the covariance tests, sorted according to parameter occurrence rate, are 
provided in Table 5. 
Table 5: Covariance results for Sample A 
72 
0 0 
Of the 272 possible covariance results, 158 (58%) are zero, 72 (26%) are positive and 42 
(15%) are negative. Table 6 shows the matched pairs for the positive values from the 
covariance analysis. In all cases, the relationship was bi-directional - either positive or 
negative in both directions. 
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Table 6: Positive values from covariance for Sample A 
o ob oe of ok ol om op or OS ot 
k kb ke kf kl km lo­ ks kt 
s sb sf si sm sr st 
t tb tl tm tp tr 
b be bf bl 
P pg pi 
f fl 
g gi 
Table 7 shows the matched pairs for the negative values from the covariance analysis. 
Table 7: Negative values from covariance for Sample A 
g: gb gf gk gl go gs 
i: ib if ik il io is 
p: pb pe Pf Pk Pi pm pr ps 
e: es 
By itself, given the parameters were treated as indicator random variables and the 
information came from unclassified sources, which may not have all the pertinent 
information known about the incident, this information provides no insight into the nature 
of the relationships between the variables directly. 
The Pearson's product-moment correlation of coefficients, presented by parameter 
occurrence rate, for Sample A is shown in Table 8. The asterisks given for the values of 
parameters consequence (c), pre-operational planning (n), unique environment (u) and 
vulnerability (v) represent that they were observed in all instances and have a direct linear 
relationship. Other than consequence, pre-operational planning, unique environment and 
vulnerability, only three relationships have an absolute value greater than 0.7, explicitly 
fg, fi, and gi, forming a triangular relationship. If the pairs with an absolute value of 0.69 
were included (be, bf, bg, and bi) only the parameters movement of people (b) and testing 
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(e) remain to be considered. By including absolute values equal to or greater than 0.5 the 
pairs bp, ko, kt, tm, tr, li, Ig, and If are under consideration. Having no other contrary 
indications and given the data was drawn from imprecise sources, the heuristic that 
absolute value of r > 0.5 indicated a substantially strong linear relationship was accepted 
for this research. Using r > 0.5, all of the parameters are under consideration for the 
network graph. 
Table 8: Results of correlation of covariance for Sample A 
Notwithstanding the parameters consequence (c), operational planning (n), unique 
environment (u) and vulnerability (v), which were observed in each case, 15 linear 
relationships were observed between the 12 parameters that form 72 one-to-one 
relationships between the parameters, and form 136 distinct triangles. A network graph, 
per Section 0, was created to facilitate understanding of the nature of the relationships 
and is shown in Figure 13. Each node represents a parameter. The edges indicate a 
relationship between the parameters, although the length of the edge has no meaning - it 




Figure 13: Complete network graph for Sample A 
Because of the parameters consequence (c), pre-operational planning (n), unique 
environment (u) and vulnerability (v) having a one to one relationship with all the other 
parameters, Figure 13 is difficult to observe the unique relationships. Therefore, Figure 
14 is provided, which clearly indicates the smaller number of relationships without 
consequence (c), pre-operational planning (n), unique environment (u) or vulnerability 
(v) as super-nodes. 
Using both the correlation of coefficients analysis and the network graph, a mathematical 
model for the surface area of Sample A was created. Essentially, the surface area is the 
sum of three individual summations: the triangles formed by seven unique relationships; 
the sum of the triangles formed by pairs of the parameters consequence (c), pre­
operational planning (n), unique environment (u) and vulnerability (v); and the sum of the 
triangles formed by parameters c, n, u and v with the other parameters. This model can 





I X(xyc) X = (p, i, g, k, o, t, f, s, m, 1, b, r, e) 
1-x l-y y = (n, u, v) 
+ 
A ZX ZY ZZ 
£ [ £ abzx + £ abzy + £ abzz + apb +atr ] a = (c, n, u, v) 
,=a ,=zx ,=zy ,=zz zx = (e,f,g,i) 
zy = (f, i, 1) 
zz = (i, 1) 
Using this equation, Heron's formula can be applied to determine the surface area of the 
triangles or the sum of the edges can be computed by adding the value of the parameters, 
instantiated as nodes. Coding this equation into MATLAB °, per Section 0, a human in 
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Figure 14: Network graph of the unique relationships from Sample A 
4.3.3. Sample A test results 
Utilizing the test criteria given in Section 3.5.5, testing was satisfactorily conducted and 
the results are shown in Table 9, Table 10, and because of its size, Appendix D. 
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Table 9: Test requirement 1.0, create geometric characteristic from a matrix results 
Expected Actual 
Remarks 
Nodes Edges Nodes Edges 
2 1 2 1 Satisfactory 
3 2 3 2 Satisfactory 
3 3 3 3 Satisfactory 
4 3 4 3 Satisfactory 
4 4 4 4 Satisfactory 
4 5 4 5 Satisfactory 
4 6 4 6 Satisfactory 
Test Protocol 
Table 10: Test requirement 2.0 and 3.0, given a matrix determine surface area and sum of 
the edge lengths results 
Test Protocol 
2.0 Surface Area 
Surface Area Expected Surface Area Computed 
0, 0,0 Error - no triangle formed Error 
0, .5, 0 Error - no triangle formed Error 
0,0, -5 Error - no triangle formed Error 
.5, 0, .5 Error - no triangle formed Error 
•5, .5, .5 .1083 .1083 
0 ,1 ,0  Error - no triangle formed Error 
0, 0,1 Error - no triangle formed Error 
1 ,0 ,1  Error - no triangle formed Error 
1 , 1 , 1  .4330 .4330 
1, -7, .7 
3.0 Sum of Edges 
0, 0,0 
0, .5, 0 
0, 0, .5 
.5, 0, .5 
•5, .5, .5 
0,1,0 
0,0,1 
1 ,0 ,1  
1 , 1 , 1  






















A graphic display of the results of the test conducted on Sample A, Figure 15, illustrates 
the results for the surface area and edge length computations using the edges of the 
triangles as the basis for the computations. Note that a scalar of 0.5 was used on the sum 
of the edges and on the errors. The scalar was then applied again for the product of the 
surface area and the sum of the edges. The scalar was used to facilitate study of the 
relationships on one graph. 
After the initial test of Sample A, the code was updated to compute the sum of the edges 
based on the network diagram. The results of the update are shown in Figure 16. Note 
that a different scalar has been used to offset the sum of the edges with the surface area 
for ease of comparison. 
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Figure 16: Test results from Sample A - sum of the edges computed from network 
diagram. 
4.4. Results of experiment for Sample A 
Sample A, consisting of 26 cases of underwater terrorism, was submitted to the geometric 
structure generated by the parameters observed within the cases and the relationships 
between those parameters are indicated by a correlation of coefficients analysis. Figure 
17 shows the surface area and the sum of the edges for Sample A. A scalar of 0.05 was 
applied to the results of the sum of the edges to facilitate plotting the surface area and the 
sum of the edges on the same graph. The total number of errors generated by the surface 
area calculations for this sample was 537 out of 3,770 calculations (14%). The least 
number of errors for the surface area calculation for any one case in Sample A was 3 
(2%) with a maximum number of errors for two different cases of47 (32%). In each case 
in Sample A, there were errors in computing surface area. 
Surface area 
— - Sumofedges 
Errors 









0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Figure 17: Sample A's surface area and sum of the edges results using the edges of the 
triangles formed for computations. 
Despite the known errors in the calculations using the triangle method, the surface area 
and the sum of the edges illustrate a relationship for both sums of the edges. The 
relationship can be seen in the scatter plot that maps the surface area to the X-axis and the 
sum of the edges to the Y-axis, shown in Figure 18 and in Figure 19 that suggest a 
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Figure 19: Sample A's surface area and sum of edges using the network method 
For the sum of the edges in Sample A, the data did not exhibit integrity errors. Recall 
that the range of the sum of the edges for the sample space ranges from 0 to a maximum 
of 870 with absolute uncertainty at 435. The sample, n=26, had a maximum value of 
679.8 and a minimum value of 560. The mean for the sample was 629.8 with a standard 
deviation of 32.1. The results of Sample A's experiment are shown in Figure 20. The 
difference from absolute uncertainty to the minimum value noted in Sample A is 125 and 
the difference from the maximum value for any case in Sample A to the computed 
maximum for Sample A was 190.2. The values for any case in Sample A are in a band 
with width 119.8. 11 of the 26 (42%) of the cases were outside of the standard deviation 











0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Figure 20: Sample A's sum of edges from the experiment 
Figure 21 shows the sum of the edges using the network diagram. It also shows the 
standard deviation of 6.6, the mean of 102.0 and is limited on the Y-axis by the point of 
absolute uncertainty (all values set to 0.5) of 72 and the maximum value for the network 
of 144. This sample had a minimum value of 89.2 and a maximum value of 112.7. 
A discussion of Sample A can be found in Section 0. 
Sample A: uncertainty to certainty with Ski uev 
84 
115 
Sample A: uncertainty to certainty wth Std Dev 
~ 100 
Figure 21: Sample A's sum of the edges using the network diagram 
4.5. Sample B 
Sample B, the remaining 25 cases (see Section 0) of the original 51 accepted, was 
analyzed and processed after making some changes to the methodology as previously 
noted. The most important change was eliminating the calculations of the surface area 
and using only the edges of the network diagram for the computation. 
4.5.1. Parameters 
Observing the second sample, Figure 22 graphically shows the descending progression of 
percentage that each parameter was observed. Again, the parameters were treated as 
indicator random variables; therefore the mean represents the percentage that each 
parameter was observed across the sample. Additionally, as indicator random variables, 
the standard deviation for the parameters would be meaningless. 
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The first 10 parameters, unique environment (u) through key resources—people (k) are 
evident at least 80% of the time. Only the parameter unique environment (u) is observed 
100% of the time. The parameters operational history (o) and propaganda (p) are also 
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Figure 22: Each parameter's occurrence in Sample B by percent 
information collection (f), surveillance (s) and testing (e), which can be grouped together 
as probing, have the lowest number of observations. 
4.5.2. Relationships 
The results of the covariance tests, sorted according to parameter occurrence rate, are 
provided in Table 11. Of the 272 possible covariance results, 214 (79%) are positive, 50 
(18%) are zero and 8 (3%) are negative. Table 12 shows the matched pairs for the 
positive values from the covariance analysis. In all cases, the relationship was bi­
directional - either positive or negative in both directions. 
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Table 11: Covariance results for Sample B 
u  m  c  V g  i  n  r  t  k  0  P  1  b  f  s  E  
u  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
m  0  .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 0  .04 .03 .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .01 0 
c 0 .04 .07 .03 .03 .03 .03 .07 .02 .02 0 0 .04 .04 .02 .01 
V 0 .04 .07 .03 .03 .03 .03 .07 .02 .02 0 0 .04 .04 .02 .01 
g 0 .04 .03 .03 .11 .11 .03 .07 .1 .09 .07 .06 .06 .05 .03 .01 
i 0 .04 .03 .03 .11 .11 .03 .07 .1 .09 .07 .06 .06 .05 .03 .01 
n 0 .04 .03 .03 .11 .11 .03 .07 .1 .09 .07 .06 .06 .05 .03 .01 
r 0 0 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .07 .06 .05 .03 .02 .06 .05 .03 .01 
t 0 .04 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .06 .05 .03 .02 .06 .05 .03 .01 
k 0 .03 .02 .02 .1 .1 .1 .06 .06 .14 .07 .06 .1 .05 .02 -.02 
0 0 .03 .02 .02 .09 .09 .09 .05 .05 .14 .12 .05 .09 .04 0 1 ©
 
P 0 .02 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .03 .03 .07 .12 .09 -.03 .11 .08 0 
1 0 .02 0 0 .06 .06 .06 .02 .02 .06 .05 .09 .09 .11 .03 .04 
b 0 .02 .04 .04 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .1 .09 -.03 .09 .07 -.01 0 
f 0 .02 .04 .04 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .04 .11 .11 .07 .12 .04 
s 0 .01 .02 .02 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .02 0 .08 .03 -.01 .12 .02 
e 0 0 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 -.02 -.02 0 .04 0 .04 .02 
Table 12: Positive values from covariance for Sample B 
m: mc mv mg mi mn mt mk mo mp ml mb mf ms 
c: cv eg ci cn cr ct ck CO cb cf cs ce 
v: vg vi vn vr vt vk vo vb vf vs ve 
g: g' ft11 & gt gk g° gP g1 gb gf 8s 8e 
i: in ir it ik io ip il ib if is ie 
n: nr nt nk no np nl nb nf ns ne 
r: rt rk ro T rl rb rf rs re 
t: tk to tP tl tb tf ts te 
k: ko kp kl kb kf ks 
o: op ol ob of 
P: P1 pf ps 
1: lb If Is le 
f: fs fe bf 
s: se 
The matched pairs for the negative values from the covariance analysis are ke, oe, pb, and 
bs. 
By itself, given the parameters were treated as indicator random variables and that the 
information came from unclassified sources, which may not have all the pertinent 
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information known about the incident; this information provides no insight into the nature 
of the relationships between the variables directly. 
The Pearson's product-moment correlation of coefficients, presented by parameter 
occurrence rate, for Sample B is given in Table 13. 
The asterisks given for the values of the parameter unique environment (u) represent that 
it was observed in all instances and has a direct linear relationship. Four of the pairs, ig, 
in, gn and vc have a linear relationship with a value of 1.0. 6 additional relationships 
have an r value of greater than 0.7: ki, kg, kn, ko, tv and tc, tending to a strong 
correlation with the parameter key resource - people (k). The correlation between 
tactics, techniques and procedures (t) continues into the correlation band of an r value 
greater than 0.6, with ti, tg, tn, tr, mv and mc. The least valued accepted relationships, 
Table 13: Correlation of coefficients for Sample B 
| u m c v g i n r T k 0 P 1 b f s e 
U H_L 
* * * * * • * * * * * * * * * 




.55 .41 .33 .23 .2 .2 .18 .13 .06 
c 1.0 .34 .34 .34 .34 .8 .22 .14 .04 -.01 .28 .26 .18 .09 
.34 .34 .34 .34 .8 .22 .14 .04 -.01 .28 .26 .18 .09 
1.0 1.0 .24 .62 .74 .59 .42 .35 .35 .33 .23 .11 
1.0 .24 .62 .74 .59 .42 .35 .35 .33 .23 .11 
.24 .62 .74 .59 .42 .35 .35 .33 .23 .11 
.62 .43 .32 .17 .11 .35 .33 .23 .11 
.43 .32 .17 .11 .35 .33 .23 .11 
.8 .36 .28 .48 .24 .09 -.22 
o .52 .24 .42 .19 -.01 -.14 
.37 -.12 .46 .37 -.04 
.36 .44 .11 .31 
.28 -.06 .01 
f .52 .33 
.14 
those greater than 0.5, include op, oi, og, on, mi, mg, mn, mt, and fs. All correlations 
above 0.5 total 25 pair-wise relationships focused on the parameters c, f, g, i, k, m, n, o, 
p, r, s, t, u, and v. 
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Sample B had 25 linear relationships between the parameters, not including unique 
environment (u) that formed 23 unique triangles and one two-node spur. If unique 
environment is added, an additional 25 triangles and two spurs are added to the geometric 
shape - a total of 48 faces and 3 spurs. A network graph is shown in 
Figure 23 that illustrates the network with all the parameters included. Figure 24 is a 
network graph with the parameter unique environment (u) omitted. 
Figure 23: Sample B network graph - all parameters 
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Figure 24: Sample B network graph without the parameter unique environment (u) 
4.5.3. Sample B test results 
Without the surface area calculations as part of the function, the test parameters were 
very similar, but omitted the requirement for surface area and surface area errors. 
Utilizing the test criteria given in Section 3.5.5, except as noted, testing was satisfactorily 
conducted and the results are shown in Table 14, Table 15 and Table 16. 




Nodes Edges Nodes Edges 
2 1 2 1 Satisfactory 
3 2 3 2 Satisfactory 
3 3 3 3 Satisfactory 
4 3 4 3 Satisfactory 
4 4 4 4 Satisfactory 
4 5 4 5 Satisfactory 
4 6 4 6 Satisfactory 
Table 15: Test requirement 3.0, given a matrix determine the sum of the edge lengths 
Test Protocol 3.0 
Sum expected Sum returned 
0, 0,0 0 0 
0, 0.5, 0 0.5 0.5 
0, 0, 0.5 .5 0.5 
0.5, 0, 0.5 1.0 1.0 
0.5, 0.5, 0.5 1.5 1.5 
0, 1,0 1.0 1.0 
0, 0,1 1.0 1.0 
1,0,1 2.0 2.0 
1, 1,1 3.0 3.0 
1, .7, .7 2.4 2.4 
Table 16: Test requirements 4.0, using special cases for the test protocol 
given in 3.0, determine the sum of the edges results 
Test protocol: Sum of the edges 
Triangle method Network method 
Expected Actual Expected Actual 
Low value test. 
All parameters set to zero 
0 0 0 0 
High value test. 
All parameters set to 1.0 
294.0 294.0 82.0 82.0 
Mid-range test. 
All parameters set to 0.5 
147.0 147.0 41.0 41.0 
Anchor test - u low. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
« = 0.1 
125.8 125.8 34.6 34.6 
Anchor test -u  high. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
u= 1.0 
173.5 173.5 49.0 49.0 
Unique test - / low. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
/ = 0.1 
146.6 146.6 40.6 40.6 
Unique test - / high. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
/= 1.0 
147.5 147.5 41.5 41.5 
Unique test -/low. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
f~ 0-1 
146.2 146.2 40.2 40.2 
Table 16: (Continued) 
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Test protocol: Sum of the edges 
Triangle method Network method 
Expected Actual Expected Actual 
Unique test - /high. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
/= i.o 
148.0 148.0 42.0 42.0 
Unique test -1 low. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
f= 0.1 
134.2 134.2 37.8 37.8 
Unique test -1 high. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
t= 1.0 
163.0 163.0 45.0 45.0 
Test anchor & unique - low. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
t = 0.1 and b =1.0 
134.7 134.7 38.3 38.3 
Test anchor & unique - high. 
All parameters set to 0.5 except 
t = 1.0 and b =0.1 
162.6 162.6 44.6 44.6 
A graphic display of the results of the test conducted on Sample B is shown in Figure 25. 
Since surface area was not computed, no scalar was used in this graph. 
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Figure 25: Test results from Sample B - triangle method 
4.5.4. Results of experiment for Sample B 
Sample B, consisting of 25 new cases of underwater terrorism, was submitted to the 
geometric structure generated by the parameters observed within the cases and the 
relationships between those parameters as indicated by a correlation of coefficients 
analysis. Figure 26 shows the sum of the edges using the triangle edge method for 
Sample B and Figure 27 shows the sum of the edges using the network method. 
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Figure 26: Sample B experimentation results - sum of edges using triangle edge method 
For the sum of the edges in Sample B, the data did not exhibit integrity errors. Recall 
that the range of the sum of the edges for the sample space ranges from 0 to a maximum 
of 294 with absolute uncertainty at 147. The sample, n=25, had a maximum value of 
267.5 and a minimum value of 174.3. The mean for the sample was 228.7 with a 
standard deviation of 25.0. The difference from absolute uncertainty to the minimum 
value noted in Sample B is 27.3 and the difference from the maximum value for any case 
in Sample B to the computed maximum for Sample B was 26.5. The values for any case 
in Sample B are in a band with width 93.2. Nineteen of the 25 (76%) of the cases were 
outside of the standard deviation with eight below and 11 above. 
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Figure 27: Sample B's experimental results - sum of edges using network method 
For the sum of the edges in Sample B, the data did not exhibit integrity errors. Recall 
that the range of the sum of the edges for the sample space ranges from 0 to a maximum 
of 82 with absolute uncertainty at 41. The sample, n=25, had a maximum value of 72.5 
and a minimum value of 49.2. The mean for the sample was 63.2 with a standard 
deviation of 6.4. The difference from absolute uncertainty to the minimum value noted in 
Sample B is 8.2 and the difference from the maximum value for any case in Sample B to 
the computed maximum for Sample B was 9.5. The values for any case in Sample B are 
in a band with width 23.3. Nineteen of the 25 (76%) cases were outside of the standard 





This Chapter provides a discussion of the research findings following the order of the 
research questions. It then discusses a comparison of the two samples and examines their 
relationship based on the hypothesis testing. It concludes with suggestions for future 
research. 
5.1. Discussion 
This research contributed to a better understanding and management of several key areas 
to the risk of underwater terrorism. First, it substantiated that the current parameters used 
by many practitioners in the risk and intelligence community are applicable. It 
demonstrated that conceptually the relationship between the parameters can be 
determined through analytics. It established the Malice Spectrum as a tool to instantiate 
the values of the parameters independent from the process of the value-determination. 
Finally, it demonstrated the proof of concept that risk can be better understood and 
managed - potentially even simulated - using the geometric characteristics of the 
network graph of the R=TVC equation. Weaknesses in this research that directly 
contribute to the applicability of this research exist - specifically the use of unclassified 
data may have reduced the granularity of the samples potentially impacting the robust 
analysis of the final geometric structure based on the relationships of the risk equation. 
Each of these points is articulated in detail, below. 
5.1.1. Parameters 
The research indicates that the parameters utilized for this study, those currently used by 
many facets of both the risk and the intelligence communities, are pertinent and 
appropriate for understanding the risk equation. Given that the equation, R=TVC was 
only parsed for the threat element; and that each case obtained for this data samples was 
intentionally an underwater incident; and that each case was, at least, a small success 
from the adversaries point of view, withdrawing vulnerability, consequence and unique 
environment from the discussion is warranted. The research design was biased towards 
those parameters. What was intriguing is that Sample B did not have a 100% correlation 
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with vulnerability and consequence, although they were noted in each case. Given that 
the purpose of an adversary is to exploit vulnerability to cause consequence, this lack of 
correlation remains unexplained. 
Both samples had the same parameters in the set of strongly evident parameters. In this 
context, evident is defined as the number of cases in which the parameter was observed 
across the sample. For both samples, the set of strongly evident parameters included 
stated goals, adversarial ideology, key resource - material and pre-operational planning. 
For parameters key resource - material and pre-operational planning, the strong 
correlation was driven by the uniqueness of the underwater environment. The special 
planning and movement of trained people to operate in the environment was often noted 
in either the databases or in the media. For the parameters stated goals and adversarial 
ideology, since each case was after the fact either a complete success or a partial success, 
the goals were known - usually by statement from the adversaries and the actual 
adversary, with the applicable ideology, was known. In a pre-event risk analysis, this 
information may be more difficult to discover. 
For the weakly evident parameters, again, both samples had a similar set that included 
movement of people, testing, information collection and logistics. The parameters 
testing, information collection and surveillance can be (and has been done so by the 
intelligence or risk communities) grouped together as probing. The lack of probing noted 
within the cases does not indicate that probing did not occur but can be accounted for 
because either it was not recorded in the databases explicitly, it was not exciting enough 
to be included in the media or, if noticed, may have thwarted the attack and would 
therefore not have allowed the event to occur. The potential to thwart an attack by 
knowledge of the attack is especially true of testing. The data do not clarify if testing is 
being actively conducted by adversaries or if the testing that was conducted resulted in 
the adversaries being thwarted by law enforcement or the defender. The parameters 
movement of people and logistics were not usually discussed in the databases or the 
media sources. Several reasons may account for the omission of movement of people or 
logistics, ranging from the information was not available to the authors or database 
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managers; the information may not make exciting reading; or the information may be of 
such a classified nature that it was not revealed in the open sources available. 
The expert solicitation validated that observing only unclassified information may have 
skewed the results. Specifically, finance (d) was considered to be one of the two most 
important variables. In discussing finance with the experts, they agreed that without 
finance, the adversarial organization would be unsuccessful. However, obtaining 
unclassified information about finance was, at best, difficult and there was not enough 
information available to ensure the data collected were accurate. The other dummy 
parameters, population index (x), criticality (y) and leadership (a) were within the 
expected areas on the scatter plot. Essentially, population index and criticality are 
element of the consequence parameter and should be evaluated in future research. 
Leadership, for any rational organization, is a significant parameter for analyzing the 
organization but frequently does not indicate the overall risk. Both leadership and 
finance are leading measures that impact other parameters. Leadership impacts ideology, 
stated goals and propaganda. Finance impacts key resource material, movement of 
people, logistics and potential key resource - people. The unclassified data did not 
provide granularity to evaluate these parameters in this research. 
One parameter that was added and did not appear to be important to the experts is the 
unique environment. The underwater environment, although mentioned, has not received 
significant treatment in the literature. This environment is a difficult area to attack in or 
defend because of the limited visibility, magnetic anomalies, sea floor debris, harsh 
operating conditions, extraneous noise and the special training and equipment needed 
(Dobkowski, 2007; Sakhuja, 2005). The analysis, biased as it was towards the unique 
environment, validates to veracity that the unique environment, when it exists, must be 
considered. The necessity to protect material and people from water, salty or otherwise, 
incurs a liability on the defender to protect critical infrastructure and a liability on the 
adversary to mount a successful attack because of the special preparations and 
opportunity for detection as material, probing and training is conducted. To this point, 
the unique environment has been a favorable factor for the defender. However, given the 
hardening of other targets, this benefit may become a liability. 
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5.1.2. Relationships 
The research demonstrated that the relationships of the risk equation can be determined 
through analytics. Examining the parameters with the highest number of correlations, 
Sample A's set was pre-operational planning, unique environment, vulnerability, 
consequence, movement of people, information collection, stated goals and adversarial 
ideology. Sample B's set was unique environment, stated goals, adversarial ideology, 
key resources - material, pre-operational planning and tactics, techniques and procedures. 
The parameter unique environment is inherent in the data since the data collection was 
biased towards only those cases in the underwater environment. Parameters stated goals, 
adversarial ideology and pre-operational planning are common to the sets and explained 
by the same effect as unique environment. Key resources - material is an intriguing 
parameter. For Sample A it had a low number of correlations and in Sample B it was 
correlated seven times - one of the highest number of correlations. A review of the 
specific cases indicates the disparity in correlations may be caused by the actual location 
where each case occurred. In the first sample, most of the cases occurred in ports where 
the adversaries lived or operated. For Sample B, most of the attacks took place where the 
adversaries had to move to. 
The parameters with the lowest number of correlations for Sample A were testing, key 
resources—people, key resources - material, operational history, propaganda, training 
and surveillance. For Sample B, they were movement of people, testing, information 
collection, logistics, propaganda, training and surveillance. The parameters testing, 
propaganda, surveillance and training are common to both samples. Interestingly 
parameters movement of people, information collection and key resource - people are in 
the lowest number of correlations for one sample, but the highest number of correlations 
for the other sample. The disparity in correlation is attributed to the small sample sizes. 
It's expected that an aggregated analysis of the samples would resolve this disparity. The 
low correlation for both testing and surveillance is not surprising, for the same reason 
noted in Section 0. The low number of correlations for propaganda is contraindicated. 
Propaganda did not appear to follow ideology and goals as strongly correlated. The 
contradiction is a weakness in the research design - the data for ideology and goals were 
recorded in the databases or the media, but the source of that information (propaganda? 
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Intelligence?) was not available. The low number of correlations for training is not 
expected. Training was noted in a majority of the cases and is inherent in an attack in 
any unique environment. Training was assumed to have a linear relationship with the 
other parameters, specifically supporting exploiting a vulnerability to obtain a 
consequence. This exception to what was expected indicates the potential utility for this 
research - training was related to tactics, techniques and procedures for both samples. It 
verifies the veracity of the parameter relationships; in this case, that training can be used 
to indicate what tactics, techniques or procedures that an adversary may be planning to 
use. 
Although Sample A had a larger sample size and larger diversity in cases, Sample B, 
which included a number of cases with Shayetet 13 or the Sea Shepherd Society as the 
adversary, had a more robust basis of verifiable information available. Potentially, 
Sample B is a better representation of what can be known about an organization. 
Using the specific information from the analysis and applying critical thinking based 
upon studying each case, the known perpetrators and the tactics used, relationships are 
apparent that may not directly correlate to the analysis. Propaganda appears to assert an 
adversarial ideology and clarify the stated goals of the organization. Indications that 
propaganda history provides support for the accumulations of both key resources: people 
and material were observed. An adversarial ideology elicits tactical stated goals and 
indicates a desire for strategic consequence, whereas the stated goals pursue tactical 
consequences as a means to obtain strategic objectives. 
People are vital to any organization. In an adversarial organization, people enable the 
employment of tactics, techniques and procedures and utilize the other key resource, 
materials, to exploit vulnerabilities. They are also required to conduct pre-operational 
planning. Pre-operational planning determines or modifies the tactics, techniques and 
procedures used. It also determines the required training, coordinates movement and 
logistics, and acquires the material key resources. Training, of course, prepares people 
for the operation. 
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As with any organization, an adversary learns from their past successes and mistakes 
through their operational history. An adversary's operational history enables effective 
propaganda and informs their pre-operational planning. Operational history can also be 
used as an indicator of tactics, techniques and procedures and informs the information 
collections efforts of the adversary. The key to understanding the operational history of 
an adversary is understanding the adversary's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). 
TTP exploits vulnerabilities to accomplish the organization's stated goals. 
Reviewing the cases, there were incidents where only one form of probing was evident. 
Without explicitly looking for one of the three element of probing - information 
collection, surveillance or testing, the signs may be lost, or the relationship each has with 
other parameters may be understated. This research suggests that each parameter should 
be viewed independently. Information collection seeks consequences be determining, 
vulnerabilities and informing the pre-operational planning. Surveillance modifies an 
adversary's pre-operational planning by influencing the design of testing and confirming 
the expected vulnerabilities. Testing, which usually occurs later in the planning cycle, 
reconciles the pre-operational planning and validates vulnerabilities that exist for the 
adversary to exploit. 
A successful attack cannot occur without the materials used in the attack (e.g. special 
equipment for underwater operations, explosives). Materials are what enable tactics, 
techniques and procedures, act upon the vulnerabilities of the defender and are used for 
training the people. The materials must be moved for training, assembly or for the attack 
via logistics. Besides moving the material, the people involved in the attack must be 
moved. Movement positions people for training, surveillance, and testing. 
The unique environment of underwater operations introduces complexities with must be 
managed and accounted for. For this research, the unique environment accounted for the 
setting or conditions in which the attack was conducted. The underwater environment is 
unlike anything else on Earth and changes drastically from target location to target 
location. Operating within the confines of a heavily trafficked, cold, noisy harbor 
(Boston) is dramatically different from a low traffic, warm water, quiet approach to 
101 
remote infrastructure (the Florida Keys). The unique environment requires special 
training and materials. Because of the interaction with the environment (water flow), this 
unique environment increases the consequence of the attack. Given the restricted 
visibility and difficulty in securing undersea boundaries, the unique environment impacts 
vulnerability, the ability to conduct pre-operational surveillance and the ability to execute 
testing. The unique environment parameter can be generalized beyond the underwater 
environment paradigm to include other unique environment like polar operations, non-
pressurized airborne attacks or sub terrarium attacks. 
5.1.3. Malice spectrum 
This research established the basis of the malice spectrum which instantiates the values 
for the parameters independent of the methods utilized to obtain those values (see Gay & 
Hester, 2012). Utilizing the malice spectrum provides a common scale for diverse 
parameters and eliminates the units of measure. Although the accuracy of determining 
the value of any parameter is minimal, the malice spectrum provides a level of precision 
that permits discrimination between cases. The analyst can add another digit to any 
number to increase the value over similar cases. For example, if an analyst believes three 
organizations have strong but similar adversarial ideologies, the analyst can assign all 
three a value of 0.7 or discriminate by assigning 0.7, 0.71 and 0.72 if there was some 
compelling reason to elevate one over another. Another strength of the malice spectrum 
is the ability to assign a value to a parameter that is independent of the method used to 
determine the parameter's score. The malice spectrum directly addresses one of the 
concerns noted in the introduction - that current methods force the analyst to use either 
statistical methods or expert opinion. Using the malice spectrum permits any method to 
be used and the results to be applied directly. The malice spectrum is also already 
aligned with the linguistic ambiguity inherent in the risk equation and is very similar to a 
model that is widely accepted by the intelligence community. 
Conversely, the malice spectrum has two detractors. First, the malice spectrum is a 
subjective, vice objective, knowledge system. Instantiating the number may be 
influenced by personal interpretations or prejudice. The first detractor leads to the second 
detractor, the ability to obtain repeatability across diverse analysts. The lack of 
102 
repeatability may be mitigated by the use of job aids or training when used in a practical 
setting. However, enhancing repeatability through job aids or training may hamper the 
effectiveness of the malice spectrum, reducing the ability for the analyst to apply critical 
thinking in an individual, subjective evaluation. 
5.1.4. Measure of risk 
Research Question Four was "What is the measure of risk?" to ensure the final value had 
meaning to the analyst and the policy maker. The original research indicated risk would 
be a measure of either volume or surface area. However, the final results indicate that 
risk can be measured as a sum of the edges between the nodes in the geometric 
representation of the risk equation, essentially acting as a proxy for the volume or surface 
area. By using the malice spectrum, the number derived from the computations became 
dimensionless - regardless of the geometric formula used. The final result of any 
comparison between cases was just a number based on length of every individual edge 
that ranged in size from zero to two. In describing the final result, the use of the term 
relative risk is appropriate since the final comparison between any two, or more, cases is 
just comparison of a series of numbers that indicate the greater likelihood of an 
unfavorable occurrence. 
5.2. Objective utility 
Can the risk of an underwater terrorism event be understood and managed using this 
process? Unequivocally yes. With known cases entered according to ascending order of 
known values of the parameters, the output demonstrated an expected increase in value 
based on the relationships of the parameters. More importantly, an understanding of the 
nature and critical path of the risk equation is emerging from this unclassified, open 
source, sampling. 
Using the surface area or the volume of the geometric shape to determine the final values 
of the relative risk of each case was not demonstrated, and in fact, was shown to be 
contraindicated because the triangles which form the surface areas tend to collapse or tear 
apart as the values of the parameters change from complete uncertainty. However, the 
value of the sum of the edges from the geometric shape created in a network diagram was 
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shown to be an effective calculation at least twice. In both samples the sum of the edges 
were shown to occupy a band well into the unfavorable solution space and the band was 
at least 18% into the unfavorable area. The band does not represent an absolute threshold 
of a pending event, but does indicate that a potential threshold could be calculated based 
on data from unsuccessful cases. 
The variations in the output, the spikes and dips when the input was provide in ascending 
order, frequently occur where the value of the input is consistent, as shown in Figure 28. 
The variations are caused by the interaction of the parameters across the relationships and 
provide a suggestion for a critical path to reduce overall risk through investment. If 
knowledge of the variations actually reduces the risk, or just reduces the numerical 







0 5 10 15 20 25 
Sample B sum of raw parameters YS sum of edges 
i i 1 r 
f' • •  
J 


















1 1 • > 
Figure 28: Comparison of Sample B's raw data to calculated relative risk 
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In the post analysis the data looked similar but was from two different models. Would 
the output from one sample on another sample's model be similar? Although not part of 
the original analysis, the research would not be complete without answering that 
question. Therefore the data for Sample B were submitted to the model created by 
Sample A for the sum of the edges computed by the edges of the triangles and by the 
edges from the network diagram. The data for Sample B were then plotted against the 
output from the Sample B model and is shown in Figure 29. Although the values from 
the Sample A model had to be scaled to plot with the results of the Sample B model, the 
similarity, despite the differing model and method is plainly evident. That different 
networks give the same relative risk solution is not surprising, since the data were linear. 
It does, however, indicate the processes are comparable and that the least complex 
solution space - the sum of the edges from the network diagram - is value added. 
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Figure 29: Sample B data through both models 
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5.3. Future research 
Several areas for future research exist, mostly focused around the limitations already 
noted throughout this paper. Although obtaining declassified abstracts of classified 
databases may answer many of the concerns noted, true research with classified data is 
required to create the most comprehensive analysis of the parameters and their 
relationships and to establish a true threshold of concern for an event horizon. The 
classified data may also provide insight into the temporal relationships between the 
parameters and facilitate development of more robust predictive tools. Once the temporal 
relationships are mapped, an analysis of how the values of the parameters changed over 
time may indicate a better measure of risk as in incorporates the temporal dimension of 
the risk equation, which heretofore has been ignored. 
Another area for research is consideration of combining information collection, pre­
operational surveillance and testing into one parameter, perhaps called "probing". What 
would aggregation of these parameters do to the analysis of overall risk? Would 
aggregation impact intelligence analysis, risk analysis or have no impact? 
The standardization of the process to determine the values of each parameter will require 
cross discipline research between the intelligence, security and insurance communities to 
develop a linguistic-based membership set which appropriately corresponds the 
qualitative values from the respective communities to the malice spectrum. Another 
concern is math doesn't take into account the linguistic spin of an evaluation. Can the 
integration of the mathematical analysis of the parameters with a linguistic analysis be 
improved? Finally, with the parameters, should any parameter be weighted? 
The original vision of this research was that risk was a complex calculation similar to the 
volume of an icosidodecahedron, also called a Hoberman sphere, increasing as the 
distance between the nodes increased. Although the ability to maintain this complex 
concept was lost to the inability to determine an accurate geometric area, the question and 
vision remain. Perhaps the surface area should be based on the sum of multiple spheres 
with the radius of each sphere equal to one or more nodes? 
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The creation of a new model for each sample drawn, although relatively equivocal, does 
not facilitate communication across risk communities. Therefore, a detailed analysis of 
the combined analytics and linguistics to develop one model that will be used across the 
domains is required. 
As Tolk (2012) noted, successful modeling and simulation requires the model to be 
conceptually valid, technically mature and applicable to the user; to wit, operationally 
applicable. This methodology, including the Malice Spectrum, has been demonstrated 
within this thesis to be conceptually valid and operationally applicable. However, there 
are several areas of technical immaturity which must be researched before utilizing the 
methodology in a real-time engagement. This includes connectivity to intelligence fusion 
networks for the collection of formatted data, integration of a data warehousing process 
to provide a continuous confidence level of the data and development of the process to 
nest (link together) various scenarios. The development of an automated algorithm to 
implement the Malice Spectrum that combines new input from intelligence Fusion 
Centers with historic trends, and expert opinion previously stored would reduce the 
processing time and provide a means for immediately evaluating the impact of 
adversarial actions on the current measured risk level. Further research into a what-if 
module would fully implement the system as a usable decision support system, 
comparable to the requirements enumerated and motivated in Tolk (2009) and will 
continue to improve the ability to manage and understand the risk of underwater 
terrorism. 
5.4. Contribution 
This research sought to improve the ability to manage and understand the risk of 
underwater terrorism by creating a model based on the relationships of the parameters in 
the risk equation. The research inductively examined available data to develop and 
analyze a list of parameters and relationships, which was used to deductively create a 
multi-perspective model of the risk equation. It identified parameters that provide a 
multi-perspective view of the underwater terrorism incident and identified the 
relationships between those parameters. The research developed and tested a method to 
quantify the qualitative variables pertinent to the underwater terrorism threat and 
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successfully evaluated 51 cases of underwater terrorism, developing a relative risk picture 
across two samples. 
It explored the feasibility of using the geometric shape generated by the network graph to 
determine the surface area as a measure of relative risk and found that to be unrealistic 
because of the numerous errors in the calculations as the parameters of the risk equation 
changed. 
This research introduced the malice spectrum as a tool to remove dimensions and 
disaggregate the determination process from the final value used to instantiate the values 
of the nodes in the network diagram. 
The research explored the concept of using the surface area or the volume of the 
geometric shape to determine the relative risk between cases but was unable to determine 
an appropriate method to keep the edges from pulling apart or collapsing on itself when 
treating the risk equation as a geometric face. It then determined the sum of the edges of 
the network diagram to determine relative risk between 51 cases across two samples. It 
showed that this method was an effective way to understand the underlying structure of 
the risk of underwater terrorism and provided a framework to manage that risk. 
108 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abt, C. (2003). The economic impact of nuclear terrorist attacks on freight transport 
systems in an age of seaport vulnerability. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, Inc. 
Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E. (2005). Code of best practice for experimentation. CCRP 
Publication Series, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). 
Almogy, G., & Rivkind, A. (2007, August). Terror in the 21st century: Milestones and 
prospects - Part I. Current Problems in Surgery, 44(8), 496-554. 
Apostolakis, G., & Lemon, D. (2005). A screening methodology for the identification 
and ranking of infrastructure vulnerabilities due to terrorism. Risk Analysis, 25, 
361-376. 
Argote, L. (1982, September). Input uncertainty and organizational coordination in 
hospital emergency units. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(3), 420-434. 
Attneave, F. (1959). Applications of information theory to psychology. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
Aven, T., & Guikema, S. (2011). Whose uncertainty assessments (probability 
distributions) does a risk assessment report: the analysts' or the experts'? 
Reliability Engineering & Systems Safety, 96, 1257-1262. 
Ayyub, B. (2005). Risk analysis for critical infrastructure and key asset protection: 
methods and challenges. Retrieved from http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/events/ 
2004 11 18/Risk_Analysis_for_Critical_Infrastructure_and_Key_Asset 
_Protection.pdf. 
Barker, K., & Haimes, Y. (2008). Assessing uncertainty in extreme events: Applications 
to risk-based decision making in interdependent infrastructure sectors. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 94, 819-829. 
Bauer, M. (2002). Paranoid penguin: Practical threat analysis and risk management. 
Linux Journal, 93, 9. 
Bedford, T., & Cooke, R. (2001). Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and 
Methods. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
109 
Berman, R. (2008). Anti-Americanism and the pursuit of politics. Retrieved from 
www.Drinceton.edu/~DDns/papers/berman.pdf. 
Bernhardt, W. (2004, May). Bridging the uncertainty gap in intelligence analysis: a 
framework for systematic risk and threat assessment. Strategic Review for 
Southern Africa, 26(1), 61-92. 
Bodnar, J.W. (2005, May). Making sense of massive data by hypothesis testing. In 
Proceedings of2005 International Conference on Intelligence Analysis. McLean, 
VA. 
Branham, Steve. (2009, May). Addressing risk in the underwater battle space - A Coast 
Guard perspective. Conference proceedings of the Mine Warfare Association, 
Panama City Beach, FL. Retrieved from http://www.minwara.org/ 
Meetings/2009 05/Presentations/wedpdf/Branham%20Mine%20Warfare%20Con 
ference.pdf. 
Bristow, M., Fang, L., & Hipel, K. W. (2012). System of systems engineering and risk 
management of extreme events: concepts and case study. Risk Analysis, in press. 
Epub ahead of print retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1539-6924/earlyview. 
Brown, G., Carlyle, M., Salmeron, J., & Wood, K. (2005, November). Analyzing the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to attack and planning defenses. Tutorials 
in Operations Research, 102-123. 
Chase, R. H., Day, J. A., Cline, D. D., & O'Hagan, J.G. (1995, May). Reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and target acquisition collection planning—embedded within the 
MEF intelligence and operations cycle. Written in fulfillment of a requirement 
for the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/dereschk.htm. 
Chemers, M. (1997). An integrative theory of leader ship. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Chi, M. (1997). Quantifying qualitative analysis of verbal data: A practical guide. The 
Journal of Learning Sciences, 6(3), 271 -315. 
Clinton, W. (1998). Presidential decision directive/NSC-63. Washington: The White 
House. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm. 
110 
Cobain, I., & Karim, F. (2011, January 17). UK linked to notorious Bangladesh torture 
center. Guardian, Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/l 7/uk-link-bangladesh-torture-centre. 
Cohen, L., Lawrence, M., & Morrison, K. (2000). Research Methods in Education (5th 
ed.). London: Routledge. 
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1983). The design and conduct of Quasi-Experiments 
and true experiments in field settings. In M. Dunnette (Ed.) Handbook of 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology. New York: Wiley. 
Costa, P., Herencia-Zapana, H., & Laskey, K. (2012). Uncertainty representation and 
reasoning for combat models. In A. Tolk (Ed.), Engineering Principles of 
Combat Modeling and Distributed Simulation (pp. 715-745). Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley. 
Crimes and Criminal Procedures, 18 U.S.C. 2331(1) (2006). 
Critical Infrastructures Protection, 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) (2001). 
Crowe, R., & Horn, R. (1967). The meaning of risk. Journal Risk Insurance, 34(3): 459-
74. 
Daneshkhah, A. (2004). Uncertainty in probabilistic risk assessment: A review. 
Retrieved from http://www.shef.ac.Uk/content/l/c6/03/09/33/risk.pdf 
Darby, J. (2004). Estimating terrorist risk withpossibility theory (LA-14179). Los 
Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratories. 
Darby, J. (2006). Evaluation of risk from acts of terrorism: The adversary/defender 
model using belief andfuzzy sets (SAND2006-5777). Albuquerque, NM: Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
Davis, P. (1994). Institutionalizing planning for adaptiveness. In P. Davis (Ed.), New 
Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough (pp.73-100). 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
DefenceWire (2008). MVInvincible/A-520 sunk. Retrieved from 
http://defencewire.blogsDot.com/mv-invinciblea-520-sunk.html. 
Dey, I. (1993). Qualitative data analysis: A user-friendly guide for social scientists. 
New York: Routledge. 
I l l  
Dillion-Merrill, R., Parnell, G., & Buckshaw, D. (2009). Logic trees: Fault, success, 
attack, event, probability and decision trees (pp 1-22). In Wiley Handbook of 
Science and Technology for Homeland Security. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Dobkowski, J. (2007, November). Using magnetic barriers to detect an underwater 
terrorist threat. Sea Technology. Retrieved from http://findarticles.com/ 
p/articles/mi aa5367/is 200711/ai n21299662. 
Dunn, E., Moore, M., & Nosek, B. (2007). The war of the words: how linguistic 
differences in reporting shape perceptions of terrorism. Analysis of Social Issues 
and Public Policy, 5(1), 67-86. 
Edmonson, R. (2006, October 27). Coast Guard: Risk-Assessment Tools Aid 
Consistency. Pacific Shipper. 
Fuard, A., & Kamalendran, C. (2006). Deadly plan to blast Colombo port. The Sunday 
Times. June 18. Retrieved from http://www.sundavtimes.lk/ 
060618/news/l .html. 
Garrick, B., Hall, J., Kilger, M., McDonald, J.C., O'Toole, T., Probst, P., et al. (2004). 
Confronting the risks of terrorism: making the right decisions. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 86, 129-176. 
Gay, R. J. (2006). Quantifier risk analysis project in Excel®. Unpublished Masters 
project for the U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area Office of Intelligence, Old 
Dominion University, Norfolk, VA. 
Gay, R. J., & Hester, P.T. (2010). Modeling risk - it's not a probability, it's a 
polyhedron. Proceedings ofHuntsville Simulation Conference 2010, Huntsville, 
AL, October 26-28. 
Gay, R. J., & Hester, P.T. (2012). Modeling risk as a polyhedron. Journal of Defense 
Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 1-8, pps (in 
press). 
Gay, R. J. (2012). Key factors in managing and understanding the risk of underwater 
terrorism. Proceedings of SpringSim 2012; Emerging Applications of M&S in 
Industry and Academia, Orlando, FL, March 26-28. 
Gendar, A., Alpert, L., & Parascandola, R. (2010). Terrorist threat on United States still 
real, warns Attorney General Eric Holder. New York Daily News, December 22. 
112 
Retrieved from http://www. nydailynews. com/news/national/2010/12/22/2010-
12-22_terrorist_threat_on_united_ 
state_still_real_warns_attorney_general_eric_holder.html. 
Gladwell, M. (2008). Outliers: The story of success. New York: Little, Brown & Co. 
GlobalSecurity.org. (n.d.). USS Cole Bombing. Retrieved March 18,2008, from 
http://www.globalsecuritv.org/securitv/Drofiles/uss cole bombing.htm. 
Greenberg, M., Chalk, P., Willis, H., Khilko, I., & Ortiz, D. (2006). Maritime terrorism: 
Risk and liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Center for Terrorism Risk 
Management Policy. 
Guikema, S. (2012). Modeling intelligent adversaries for terrorism risk assessment: some 
necessary conditions for adversary models. Risk Analysis, 32:1, 1117-1121. 
Gupta, D. (2005, September). Toward an integrated behavioral framework for analyzing 
terrorism: individual motivations to group dynamics. Democracy and Security. 
Haimes, Y., & Horowitz, B. (2004). Modeling interdependent infrastructures for 
sustainable counterterrorism. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 10(2), 33-41. 
Haimes, Y. (2002). Roadmap for modeling risks of terrorism to the homeland. Journal 
of Infrastructure Systems, 8(2), 35-41. 
Haimes, Y. (2004). Risk modeling, assessment, and management (2nd ed.). Hoboken, 
NJ: Wiley. 
Hasslinger, K. (2008, March). Undersea warfare: The hidden threat. Armed Forces 
Journal. Retrieved from http://www.afii.com/20Q8/03/3463927. 
Healy, M., & Perry, C. (2000). Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and reliability of 
qualitative research within the realism paradigm. Qualitative Market Research -
An International Journal, 3(3), 118-126. 
Hedges, M., & Karasik, T. (2010). Evolving terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures 
(FTP) migration across South Asia, Caucasus and the Middle East. INEGMA 
Special Report No. 7. Institute of Near East and Gulf Military Analysis 
(INEGMA). 
HellstrOm, T. (2007). Critical infrastructure and systemic vulnerability: Towards a 
planning framework. Safety Science, 45, 415-430. 
113 
Helton, J., Johnson, J., Oberkampf, W., & Salaberry, C. (2006). Sensitivity analysis in 
conjunction with evidence theory representations of epistemic uncertainty. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 91, 1414-1434. 
Hill, F. (1993). Research methodology and the management disciplines: The need for 
heterogeneity. Irish Journal of Management, 14(2), 46-57. 
Hill, F. (2004). Attacking Asymmetrical Warfare Simulation Issues. Conference 
proceedings from the 2004 Spring Simulation Interoperability Workshop (SIW). 
Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization. Arlington, VA. Retrieved 
from http://www.sisostds.org/index.php?tg=articles&idx=More&article= 
126&topics=58. 
Holmgren A. (2004). Vulnerability analysis of electrical power delivery networks, 
(TRITA-LWR LIC 2020). Stockholm: Department of Land and Water Resources 
Engineering. 
Horowitz, B., & Haimes, Y. (2003). Risk-based methodology for scenario tracking, 
intelligence gathering, and analysis for countering terrorism. System Engineering, 
6(3): 152-169. 
Huitt, W. (1998). Critical thinking: An overview. Educational Psychology Interactive. 
Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University. Retrieved from 
http://chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/cogsvs/critthnk.html. 
IAEA (2003). Security of radioactive sources, interim guidance for comment. Vienna: 
Radiation Safety Section, IAEA. 
ISO Guide 73:2009 (2009). Risk management vocabulary. Geneva: International 
Organization for Standardization. 
Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, (n.d.). 8 signs of terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://in.gov/iifc/2331 .htm. 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructures (2004). IJCIS Leaflet. Retrieved from 
https://www.inderscience.com/www/IJCIS leafletpdf. 
Jaeger, C. (2002, November/December). Vulnerability assessment methodology for 
chemical facilities (VAM-CF). Chemical Health & Safety, 15-19. 
Jenelius E., Petersen T., & Mattson, L-G. (2006). Importance and exposure in road 
network vulnerability analysis. Transportation Research, 40(7), 537-560. 
114 
Jha, M. (2009, March). Dynamic Bayesian network for predicting the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack at critical transportation infrastructure facilities. Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems, 75:1(31), 31-39. 
Johnson, J., Khater, M., & Kuzak, D. (2005). Critical facility terrorist risk assessment 
and estimates of nation-wide terrorism risk, Symposium on Terrorism Risk 
Analysis, Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California. Retrieved from 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/events/2004 11 18/Critical Facility Terrorist Ri 
sk Assesment and Estimatess of Nationwide Terrorism Risk.pdf. 
Joint Doctrine Division. (2010, as amended through May 15,2011). DOD dictionary of 
military and associated terms (JP 1-02). Defense Technical Information Center. 
Retrieved from: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new pubs /jpl 02.pdf/. 
Jonas, J., & Harper, J. (2006, December 11). Effective counterterrorism and the limited 
role of predictive data mining. Policy Analysis (584). CATO Institute. 
Jones, E., Lyford, J., Qazi, M., Solan, N., & Haimes, Y. (2003). Virginia's critical 
infrastructure protection study. In M. Jones, B. Tawney, & K. White Jr. (Eds.) 
Proceedings of the 2003 Systems and Information Engineering Design 
Symposium (pp. 177-182). Blacksburg, VA. Retrieved from 
http://www.svs.virginia.edu/sieds03/proceed2003/proceedings/B303.pdf. 
Jorion, P. (2001). Value at risk: The new benchmark for managing financial risk. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Professional. 
Kaplan, S. (2002). Applying the general theory of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
to terrorism risk. In Risk-Based Decision Making in Water Resources (pp. 77-81). 
American Society of Engineers. 
Kaplan, S., & Garrick, B. (1981). On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis, 
7(1). 11-27. 
Kelly, D., & Smith, C. (2009). Bayesian inference in probabilistic risk assessment - The 
current state of the art. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 94, 628-43. 
Kent, S. (1964). Words of estimative probability (unclassified 22 Feb 1993). Studies in 
Intelligence, Fall, 49-65. Retrieved from https://! 98.81.129.141 /librarv/center-
for-the-studv-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol8no4/pdf/v08i4a06p.pdf. 
115 
Kessel, R. (2007, June 5-7). Protection in ports: Countering underwater intruders. UDT 
Europe, Undersea Defence Technology Europe, Naples, Italy. Reprinted in 
NURC-PR-2007-005. 
Kesselman, R. (2008). Verbal probability expressions in National Intelligence Estimates: 
A comprehensive analysis of trends from the 1950's to Post 9/11. International 
Studies Assoc 49fh Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco. 
March 26, 2008. 
King, G., Keohane, R., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Koonce A., Apostolakis, G., & Cook, B. (2008). Bulk power grid risk analysis: Ranking 
infrastructure variable according to their risk significance. International Journal 
of Electric Power & Energy Systems, 30(3), 169-183. 
Krauss, Steven E. (2005). Research paradigms and meaning making: a primer. The 
Qualitative Report, 10(4), 758-770 
Kushma, J., & Rubin, C. (2009). Focal points in homeland security/emergency 
management research and practice. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency 
Management, 5(1): art 30. 
Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lee, A., & Baskerville, R. (2003). Generalizing generalizabiiity in information systems 
research. Information System Research, 14(3), 221-243. 
Lempert R., Popper, S., & Bankes, S. (2003). Shaping the next one hundred years: New 
methods for quantitative, long-term policy analysis (MR-1626-CR). Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Levitin, G., & Ben-Haim, H. (2008). Importance of protections against intentional 
attacks. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 93, 639-46. 
Linebarger, P. (1954). Psychological warfare. Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press. 
Lipshitz, R., & Strauss, O. (1997). Coping with uncertainty: A naturalistic decision­
making analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
69(2), 149-163. 
116 
Lipton, E. (2005, February 20). Audit Faults US for its spending on port defense. 
(correction appended). New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/20/politics/20secure.html. 
Liu, Y-Q., Chen, Y-W., Gao, F., & Jiang, G-P. (2005). Risk evaluation using evidence 
reasoning theory. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on 
Machine Learning and Cybernetics. Guangzhou, 2855-2860. Retrieved from 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.isp?arnumber=Q 1527429. 
Lorenz, A. (2007). Al Qaeda's maritime threat. Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center. Retrieved 
from http://www.ict.org.i1/apage/l 1847.phpApril 15.2007. 
Luce, R., & Raffia, H. (1957). Games and decisions. New York: Wiley. 
Lueck, G. A., & Spurlock, D. (2003). Research methods in engineering management: 
Approaches to studying people. ASEM 24th National Conference Proceedings. 
St. Louis, 458-462. Retrieved from http://www.gbv.de/dms/tib-ub-
hannover/379932199.pdf. 
Macgill, S., & Siu, Y. (2005). A new paradigm for risk analysis. Futures, 37, 1105-1131. 
Magee, J. (1961). General insurance (6th ed.) Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin. 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MSTA). (2002). US Public Law 107-295, 
Nov. 25, 2002. 
Medalia, J. (2005). Terrorist nuclear attacks on seaports: Threat and response 
(Congressional Report No. RS21293) Updated January 24,2005. Washington 
DC: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service. 
Meehl, P. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald and the 
slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 
46, 806-834. 
Mendenhall, W., & Sincich, T. (1995). Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences (4th 
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Miller, G. (1953). What is information measurement? American Psychologist, 8, 3-11. 
MSller, N., & Hansson, S. (2008). Principles of engineering safety: Risk and uncertainty 
reduction. Reliability Engineering System Safety, 93, 776-83. 
117 
Moteff, J. (2004). Risk management and critical infrastructure protection: Integrating 
and managing threats, vulnerabilities and consequences Congressional Report 
No. RL32561). Washington, DC: Library of Congress Congressional Research 
Service. 
Moteff, J., Copeland C., & Fischer J. (2003). Critical infrastructures: What makes an 
infrastructure critical? Report to Congress. Washington, D.C. 
NATO SAS-026,039. (2002). NATO code of best practice for C2 assessment. CCRP 
Publication Series, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). 
National Intelligence Estimate (July, 2007). The terrorist threat to the US Homeland. 
National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC. 
Outhwaite, W. (1983). Concept formation in social science. London: Routledge. 
Ozeren, S.; Gunes, I., & Al-Babayneh, D. M., (Eds.) (2007). Understanding terrorism: 
Analysis of sociological and psychological aspects. Proceedings of the NATO 
Advanced Research Workshop on Sociological and Psychological Aspects of 
Terrorism, Washington, D.C., 8-9 September 2006. Netherlands: IOS Press. 
Pappalardo, Joe (2009, October). 3 new ways the U.S. Navy will fight underwater 
terrorism. Popular Mechanics. Retrieved from http://www. 
popularmechanics.com/technology/military/4249315. 
Parnell, G., Smith, C., & Moxley, F. (2010). Intelligent adversary risk analysis: A 
bioterrorism risk management model. Risk Analysis, 30(1), 32-48. 
Pate-Cornell, E. M. (2005). Risks of terrorist attacks: Probabilistic assessment and use of 
intelligence information. Symposium on Terrorism Risk Analysis, University of 
Southern California. Los Angeles, CA. 
Patterson S., & Apostolakis G. (2006). Identification of critical locations across multiple 
infrastructures for terrorist actions. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 92, 
1183-1203. 
Pfeffer, I. (1956). Insurance and economic theory. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin. 
Philippe, J. (2001). Value at risk: The new benchmark for managing financial risk. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
118 
Propaganda. (2011). In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved from httD://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionarv/Dropaganda. 
RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID). Retrieved from 
http://rand.org/ise/proiects/terrorismdatabase/. 
Rao, K., Kushwaha, H., Verma, A., & Srividya, A. (2007). Quantification of epistemic 
and aleatory uncertainties in level-1 probabilistic safety assessment studies. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 92, 947-56. 
Reid, E. F., & Chen, H. (2007). Mapping the contemporary terrorism research domain. 
International. Journal of. Human-Computer Studies, 65, 42-56. 
Richardson, M. (2004). A time bomb for global trade: Maritime-related terrorism in an 
age of weapons of mass destruction. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Roland, H., & Moriarty, B. (1983). System safety and engineering management. New 
York: Wiley. 
Roper, C. (1999). Risk management for security professionals. London: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
Rosenthal, R. (2002). The Pygmalion effect and its mediating mechanisms. In J. Aronson 
(Ed.). Improving Academic Achievement, Impact of Psychological Factors on 
Education (pp. 25-36). San Diego: Elsevier. 
Rothschild, C., McLay, L., & Guikema, S. (2012). Adversarial risk analysis with 
incomplete information: A level-k approach. Risk Analysis, 32(7), 1219-1231. 
Runkel, P., & McGrath, E. J. (1972). Research on human behavior: A systematic guide 
to method. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Saito, T., Guthmuller H., & DeWeert, M. (2005, April). Port and Harbor Security, 
(UCRL-JRNL-208854). OE Magazine, 15-17. 
Sakhuja, V. (2005). Terrorist's underwater strategy. Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies, art 1679. Retrieved from http://www.ipcs.org/Terrorism 
kashmirLeve!2. i sp?action=:show V iew&kV alue=1692&subCatID= 1014&status=ar 
ticle&mod=g. 
119 
Samson, S., Reneke, J., & Wiecek, M. (2009). A review of different perspectives on 
uncertainty and risk and an alternative modeling paradigm. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 94, 558-567. 
Schmid, A., & Jongman, A. (1988). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, 
concepts, databases, theories, and literature (2nd ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction. 
Shannon, C., & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication. 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Shemmings, D. (2006). Quantifying qualitative data: An illustrative example of the use 
of Q methodology in psychosocial research. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 
3(2), 147-165. 
Shigemoto, K. (2002). Weber-Fechner's Law and demand function. Tezukayama 
Academic Review, 9, 41-46. 
Smelser, N. J. & Baltes, P. B. (2001). International encyclopedia of the social and 
behavioral sciences. Amsterdam; New York: Elsevier, 15105-15106. 
SRI International (2007). PRIME: A PMESII (political, military, economic, social, 
infrastructural and informational) model development environment. AFRL-RI-RS-
TR-2007-281. Rome, New York: US Air Force Research Laboratory. 
Steinberg, A. (2005). Threat assessment technology development. In A. Dey, B. 
Kokinov, D. Leake & R. Turner (Eds.), Modeling and using context (pp. 490-
500). Berlin: Springer. 
South Asia Terrorism Portal (2010). Suicide attacks by the LITE. Retrieved from 
http://www.satD.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/data 
suicide killings.htm. 
STRATFOR (2005, September 29). Vulnerabilities in the terrorist attack cycle. 
Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/vulnerabilities terrorsit attack cvcle. 
Suzic, R. (2005). A generic model of tactical plan recognition for threat assessment. In 
V. Dasarathy, (Ed.), Proceedings of SPIE, 5813, Multisensor, Multisource 
Information Fusion: Architectures, Algorithms, and Applications, Orlando, FL 
(pp. 105-116). Bellingham: SPIE. 
120 
Thompson, J. D. (2006). Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative 
theory. 4th printing. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Tolk, A. (2009). Using simulation systems for decision support. In A. T. & El Sheikh 
(Eds.), Handbook of Research on Discrete Event Simulation Environments: 
Technologies and Applications (pp. 317-336). Hershey, PA:IGI Global. 
Tolk, A. (2012). Challenges of combat modeling and distributed simulation. In A. Tolk 
(Ed.), Engineering Principles of Combat Modeling and Distributed Simulation (in 
press). New York:Wiley. 
Underwater Defence Technology (2010). UDT Asia Conference and Exhibit, Singapore, 
Conference themes. Retrieved from http://www.udt-asia.com/ 
page.cfm/Link=41 /t=m/goSection=3. 
U.S. Army (1985). Field Manual 700-80, Logistics. Department of the Army. 
U.S. Army (2011). Field Manual 3-0, change 1, Operations. Department of the Army. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (2008). Threat assessment. Retrieved from 
http://www.nrc .gov/security/domestic/phys-protect/threat.html. 
Vasan, R. S. (2008a). Incident Analysis: sinking of SLN Dvora craft on 22nd March 2008. 
South Asia Analysis Group. 
Vasan, R. S. (2008b). SRI LANKA: Sinking of a 520/MV Invincible in Trincomalee. 
South Asia Analysis Group. 
Vidalis, S. (2004). A critical discussion of risk and threat analysis methods and 
methodologies (CS-04-03). Wales, UK: School of Computing, University of 
Glamorgan. 
Von Winterfeldt, D., & Rosoff, H. (2005). Using project risk analysis to counter 
terrorism. Symposium on Terrorism Risk Analysis, Los Angeles CA: University 
of Southern California. Retrieved from http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/ 
assets/002/51845.pdf. 
Wheaton, K. & Chido, D. (2008). Words of Estimative Probability. Competitive 
Intelligence Magazine, 11(5). Retrieved from http://www.scip.org/Publications/ 
CIMArticleDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=5813. 
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics. New York: Wiley. 
121 
Willett, A. (1901). The economic theory of risk and insurance, (1951 printing). 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Willis, H., Morral, A., Kelly, T., & Medby J. (2005). Estimating terrorism risk. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. 
Woo, G. (1999). The mathematics of natural catastrophes. London: Imperial College 
Press. 
Woo, G. (2002). Quantitative Terrorism Risk Assessment. Journal of Risk Finance, 
4(1), 7-14. 
Yin, R. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Yu, W., & Harris, T. (2009). Parameter uncertainty effects on variance-based sensitivity 
analysis. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 94, 596-603. 
Zhang, L., Mitchell, B., Falzon, L., Davies, M., Kristensen, L., & Billington, J. (2001). 
Model-based operational planning using coloured petri nets. 6th International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Annapolis, MD. 
Retrieved from http://www.dodccrp.org/ 
events/6th ICCRTS/Tracks/Papers/Track3/054 tr3.pdf. 
Zimmerman, R. (2005). Outside of the box: Indicator-based assessments for terrorist 
attacks against critical infrastructure. Terrorism Risk Analysis, Los Angeles, CA: 
University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://www.usc.edu/ 
dept/create/events/2004 11 18/Outside of the box indicators based assessmen 




Concept Variable Operational definition 
Risk R R = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence 
Threat T T = Intent * Capability * Activity 
Intent I I = Propaganda * Stated Intention * Adversarial 
ideology 
Capability C C = Tactics, techniques & procedure * Operational 
history * key resources (people) * key resources 
(material) 
Activity A A = Logistics * Movement of people * Surveillance 
* Information collection * Testing 
Propaganda P Propagating ideas and/or information for the purpose 




i The beliefs that guide a group in opposition to the 
Defender's ideology or values 
Stated goals g The explicitly declared results desired that the 




The people directly involved in conducting the attack, 








o The past operations conducted by the adversary. 
Tactics, techniques 
and procedures 
t People working together in non-prescriptive methods 
or by following common methodologies. 
Pre-operational 
surveillance 
s Observing a target to determine strengths, weaknesses 
and forces available. 
Key resources -
material 
m The acquisition of supplies necessary to conduct 
operations. 








Any intervention meant to teach a person a particular 
skill or behavior related to adversarial conduct. 
Unique 
environment 
u The setting or conditions in which the attack will be 
conducted in or access to the Defender through. 
Testing e 
Adversarial actions intend to provoke an observable 
response to an aggressive stimulus. 
Information 
collection f 
Collecting information on a person or facility to assist 
in preoperational planning. 
Vulnerability V 
"The set of critical infrastructure-specific 
opportunities available for an adversary to exploit in 
conducting operations, including reconnaissance and 
operational attacks" (Gay & Hester, 2010). 
Consequence c "The total subjective value of damage inflicted as 
the result of an attack on critical infrastructure" 
(Gay & Hester, 2010) 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA COLLECTION PLAN 
Justification 
The purpose of this data collection is to determine what the parameters of an underwater 
terrorism incident are as an initial effort to manage and understand the risk of underwater 
terrorism. At the end of this collection process the answer to the first research question 
(What are the parameters of an underwater terrorism incident?) should be answered. 
Data Collection Process 
Initial data will be obtained, utilizing keywords, from unclassified government or 
educational databases available on the internet. That data will form a basis for collecting 
additional open source data from the internet. Open source data will require at least two 
independent sources to be considered valid. Additional details may require the use of 
interviews with analysts having access to classified data to obtain unclassified amplifying 
information. 
Key words: 
underwater undersea submerged submarine 
marine maritime aquatic diver 
limpet UWIED 
Detailed procedure for database search: 
• Identify trusted data source. 
• Using individual key words, search data base. 
• Download obtained data, preferably in Excel format, to home directory. 
• Each successful search will be documented with the database name, date searched 
and key words used. 
• Each successful search will be saved as a separate file using the naming 
convention: databasename_keyword(date).xls. 
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• Note information in the Data Collection Log. 
• Copies of the files will be stored at two different locations (personal and work 
computers). 
Detailed procedure for open source search: 
• Using the initial parameters collected above, search for applicable open source 
records. 
• Identify trusted data sources from the returned search items. 
• Save applicable files to the home directory. Save in .pdf format using the author's 
last name as the file name. 
• Note information in the Data Collection Log. 
• Copies of the files will be stored at two different locations (personal and work 
computers). 
Privacy Protection 
Not applicable. No personally protected or classified data is expected to be collected. 
Records Management 
As noted above. 
Storage & Destruction 




DATA COLLECTION LOG EXAMPLE 
Source Name: Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) 
Source Type: Open source & unclassified; 2004 - 2009; Domestic & international 
Date Searched: Aug 12, 2011 @ 1600 






Maritime 6 0 
Aquatic 0 
Diver 1787 Exported, suspect nothing relative 
in collected. 
Limpet 0 
UWIED 7 0 All appeared to be LED not 
UWIED 
Files created: One spreadsheet made: WITS_Diver_AUG12. 
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set to zero 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected 










set to 1.0 





set to 0.5 
72 15.6967 435 72 
Anchor 




set to 0.5 
except 
n = 0.1 
65.6 11.0275 390.2 65.6 
n = u = v = c 
Anchor 




set to 0.5 
except 
n= 1.0 





smaller as n 
increases 
until the two 






























set to 0.5 
except 
u = 0.1 
65.0 11.0275 390.2 65.0 






set to 0.5 
except 
u = 1.0 





smaller as n 
increases 
until the two 









set to 0.5 
except 
v = 0.1 
65.6 11.0275 390.2 65.6 
n = u = v = c  
Anchor 




set to 0.5 
except 
v = 1.0 





smaller as n 
increases 
until the two 






























set to 0.5 
except 
c = 0.1 
65.6 11.0275 390.2 65.6 
n = u = v = c 
Anchor 




set to 0.5 
except 
c = 1.0 





smaller as n 
increases 
until the two 









set to 0.5 
except 
6 = 0.1 
68.4 13.2787 411.8 68.4 
Unique. 
Unique 




set to 0.5 
except 
b= 1.0 

























- e low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
e = 0.1 
70.0 14.8629 427 70.0 
e = k = 
m = p = r 
Unique test 
- e high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
e = 1.0 








set to 0.5 
except 
/= o.i 
68.8 13.4455 413.4 68.8 





set to 0.5 
except 
/= 1-0 





- g low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
s = 0.1 
68.8 13.4455 413.4 68.8 


























set to 0.5 
except 
*-1.0 





- i low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
i = 0.1 
68.8 13.4455 413.4 68.8 
f = g  =  i  
Unique test 
- i high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
i=1.0 





- k low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
k = 0.1 
70.0 14.8629 427 70.0 
e = k = 
m = p = r 
Unique test 
- k high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
k= 1.0 





























set to 0.5 
except 
/ = 0.1 
69.2 13.9458 418.2 69.2 
Unique. 
Unique test 
- / high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
/= 1.0 





- m low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
m = 0.1 
70.0 14.8629 427 70.0 
e = k = 
m = p = r 
Unique test 
- m high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
m= 1.0 





- o low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
o - 0.1 
70.4 15.1964 430.2 70.4 























- o high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
o= 1.0 







set to 0.5 
except 
p = 0.1 
70.0 14.8629 427 70.0 
e = k = 





set to 0.5 
except 
p= 1.0 





- r low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
r = 0.1 
70.0 14.8629 427 70.0 
e = k = 
m = p = r 
Unique test 
- r high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
r = 1.0 


























- j low. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
5 = 0.1 
70.4 15.1964 430.2 70.4 
o = s 
Unique test 
- s high. 
All 
parameters 
set to 0.5 
except 
5=1.0 







set to 0.5 
except 
* = 0.1 






set to 0.5 
except 
/= 1.0 









set to 0.5 
except 
n = 0.1 and 
p=1.0 






























set to 0.5 
except 
n= 1.0 and 
p =0.1 
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